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Abstract
All organisms on this planet live in a dynamic environment that undergoes changes. Thus,
the ability to adapt becomes a key to survival and the adaptation of species to a changing
environment is a long-standing question in biology. Adaptation is a mutation process
which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species, and usually includes
two components: genetic adaptation and learning. In this doctoral research, we investigate
adaptive learning by combining the concept of incompetence with evolutionary population
dynamics. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training are considered as learning
processes with a focus on social interactions of individuals. We introduce incompetence
into a learning function in a single-population game and analyse its effect on the outcome
of the selection. We show that incompetence can change the result of the competition and
evolutionary dynamics. This indicates the significance of incompetence within what are
inherently imperfect natural systems. Furthermore, we define a new concept learning ad-
vantages that becomes crucial when environments are constantly changing, requiring rapid
adaptation from species. We show that rapid adaptation may lead to the evolutionarily
weak phase when even evolutionary stable populations become vulnerable to invasions.
We apply this knowledge to the foraging strategies of marine bacteria to investigate how
their optimal foraging depends on environmental shifts and behavioural randomisation of
species. Application of game theory to microbial interactions is popular as the theory can
be experimentally verified due to rapid rates of bacterial evolution. We use evolutionary
game theory to investigate how bacterial motility and chemotaxis provide a competitive
edge in different environments, and how this may change as bacteria behaviourally adapt
to their environmental conditions.
Declaration by author
This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published
or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have
clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly authored works that I have included
in my thesis.
I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statisti-
cal assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional
editorial advice, financial support and any other original research work used or reported
in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since
the commencement of my higher degree by research candidature and does not include a
substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other
degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated
which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.
I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University
Library and, subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the
thesis be made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act
1968 unless a period of embargo has been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School.
I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copy-
right holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission
from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis and have sought permission
from co-authors for any jointly authored works included in the thesis.
ii
Publications included in this thesis
Kleshnina M., Filar J.A., Ejov V. and McKerral J.C. Evolutionary games under incompe-
tence. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 77(3):627– 646, 2018. Incorporated in Chapters
2 and 3.
Submitted manuscripts included in this thesis
Kleshnina M., Filar J.A. and Gonza´lez-Tokman C. Nonlinear learning and learning ad-
vantages in evolutionary games. Submitted, 2018. Incorporated in Chapter 4.
Other publications during candidature
No other publications.
iii
Contributions by others to the thesis
The following contributions have been made to this PhD thesis:
1. Prof. Jerzy A. Filar: contributed to the design of the research project, analysis and
interpretation of the results, mathematical proofs, as well as to a critical revision
and editing of the manuscript.
2. Prof. James G. Mitchell: contributed to the interpretation of the research results
and their applications to microbial communities, as well as to a critical revision of
Chapter 5.
3. Ms. Jody C. McKerral: contributed to the interpretation of the research results
from biological perspective and critical revision of the paper on which Chapter 3 is
based.
4. A/Prof. Vladimir Ejov: contributed to mathematical analysis and various proofs in
Chapter 3.
5. Dr. Cecilia Gonza´lez-Tokman: contributed to the idea of periodic learning and
mathematical analysis and proofs in Chapter 4.
6. Dr. Amie R. Albrecht: contributed to a critical revision of the manuscript.
Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of
another degree
No works submitted towards another degree have been included in this thesis.
Research Involving Human or Animal Subjects
No animal or human subjects were involved in this research.
iv
Acknowledgements
“It is a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your door. You step onto the road, and if
you don’t keep your feet, there’s no knowing where you might be swept off to.”
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings
Returning to study after several years of working in industry is a challenging task. This
is especially so, when one is far away from their home country. The completion of this
task would not be possible without all the support from a number of people.
I would like to thank my supervisory team for making this possible. In first place, this
would not happen without all the trust and patience of Jerzy Filar, who was a wise
supervisor, a professional mentor, an understanding friend and, even sometimes, a caring
parent. Also, I would like to thank Vladimir Ejov who invested enormous amount of
effort to assist my adaptation to Australia and this project benefited greatly from our
discussions. I would like to thank Amie Albrecht, who was a patient and inspiring mentor
when I started my PhD and was looking for a direction of research. And last, but not
least, I would like to thank James Mitchell who made a very important contribution to the
project when it was very much needed: when we started to ask ourselves if this theoretical
idea could be applied to any real biological problem. In addition, Phil Howlett, as the
leader of the grant which supports this project, offered many useful insights.
However, this would also not be possible without Jody McKerral, who is a great friend,
a brilliant and inspiring researcher, and a wonderful co-author. It was such a great
time collaborating at Flinders University! Moreover, the SMP team at the University of
Queensland is also awesome! I would like to thank CARM people, especially Roxanne
Jemison and Sabriba Streipert, for their thoughtful advice and willingness to help any
time it was needed. I would also like to say “Spasibo” to Yoni Nazarathy for his sense
v
of humour and stressless support. And a big thank you to Cecilia Gonza´lez-Tokman who
was always open to insightful discussions which helped to improve this project.
And, of course, my friends and family made this journey possible. My mother was always
there ready to support or just to listen whenever that was needed. Her belief in me was
sometimes the only thing that kept me going. My dearest friend Antonina Volokitina
made this journey much more enjoyable than it would have been without her sense of
humour and support. Also, I would like to thank Maxim Danilov for inspiring me and
Alexey Kogai for insisting that I apply for a PhD position. Another big thank you to
Manuel Staab who was my support over these final months of my PhD completion, and
who believed in me and did not let me panic too much.
There are many more people who helped me during my studies. I would like to thank
every one of them, even though I have not listed their names.
vi
Financial support
This research was supported by Australian Research Council Discovery Grants DP160101236
“The fundamental equations for inversion of operator pencils” and DP150100628 “Per-
turbations in complex systems and games”.
In addition, during this project all travel to conferences was supported by the School of
Mathematics and Physics travel award, ANZIAM and AustMS Student Support Schemes,
and the AustMS WIMSIG Cheryl E. Praeger Travel Award.
vii
Keywords
Evolutionary game theory, incompetence, replicator dynamics, microbial games, chemo-
taxis, foraging strategies.
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)
ANZSRC code: 010204, Dynamical Systems in Applications, 40%
ANZSRC code: 010202, Biological Mathematics, 40%
ANZSRC code: 060504, Microbial Ecology, 10%
ANZSRC code: 060303, Biological Adaptation, 10%
Fields of Research Classification
FoR code: 0102, Applied Mathematics, 80%
FoR code: 0605, Microbiology, 20%
viii
Contents
List of Figures xv
List of Notations xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Incompetence and microbial games 6
2.1 Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Games and strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Equilibria in games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 Incompetence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Evolutionary game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Evolution as a game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ix
2.2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 Replicator dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Evolutionary dynamics under incompetence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Learning versus incompetence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Evolutionary game theory applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Microbial interactions as evolutionary games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6.1 Marine bacteria and their foraging strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Incompetence in evolutionary games 27
3.1 Motivating example: a Hawk-Dove game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Perturbations under incompetence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Three strategies: Hawks, Doves and Retaliators (HDR) . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Nonlinear learning in evolutionary games under incompetence 51
4.1 Evolutionary dynamics with nonlinear learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Individual nonlinear learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 Time-dependent bifurcations and critical times . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Environmental fluctuations: periodic forcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Learning advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
x
5 Microbial games under incompetence 85
5.1 Optimal foraging strategies for marine bacteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 Learning to forage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3 Randomisation as a survival mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6 Summary and future research 105
6.1 Incompetence in evolutionary games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.2 Hierarchical learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.3 Extensions to cooperative evolutionary games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.3.1 Stochastic evolutionary games and adaptation to complex environ-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4 Applications of the research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A A special form of the Jacobian matrix 110
B Singular perturbations of a fitness matrix 114
C Analysis of the foraging game 117
xi
List of Figures
3.1 The flow of the HDR-game. Here, the unstable point is captured as an
empty circle and the stable point is captured as a filled circle. We use the
Wolfram MATHEMATICA project [63] to produce phase planes for this
manuscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 The flow for the HDR-game for: (a) λ = 0, (b) λ = 3
25
∈ (0, 1
7
), (c) λ = 1
7
,
(d) λ = 1
4
∈ (1
7
, 1
3
), (e) λ = 1
3
, (f) λ = 3
5
∈ (1
3
, 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 The frequencies of HDR strategies at the Hawk-Dove edge fixed point (left
panel) and probabilities of meeting HDR strategies at this point (right
panel) depending on λ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.001,
b = 5, 000, α = 10. For these values of the parameters we see that Hawk’s
strategy represented as a red line is more frequent for low competence of
species. Once λ(t) reaches its half-saturation rate (around t = 500) we
observe that stable coexistence of Hawks and Doves emerges. . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.001,
b = 10, 000, α = 10. Here the stable coexistence emerges much later as
λ(t)→ 1 much slower, compared to Figure 4.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xii
4.3 Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.005,
b = 2, 500, α = 10. Here the stable coexistence emerges much earlier as
λ(t)→ 1 much faster, compared to Figure 4.1, and at t = 300 populations
of Hawks and Doves stably coexist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4 The learning function λ(t) for α = 0.05 and a period of approximately 125
days. This learning process may represent adaptation of species to periodic
fluctuations, e.g. seasonal environmental changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5 Game flow (a) and population dynamics (b) for Hawk-Dove-Retaliator
game. The game has an ESS which is a fair mixture of Hawks and Doves.
There is also a pointwise fixed line where any mixture between Retaliators
and Doves is stable and desirable. However, this line is not robust and does
not persist ant small perturbations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.6 Population dynamics for the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game for three different
starting levels of incompetence corresponding to one periodic adaptation
trajectory λ(t): (a) the starting level of incompetence S1 with fully mixed
executions; (b) the starting level of incompetence S2 with strictly struc-
tured executions where Hawks and Doves interchange their behaviour and
Retaliators obtain a completely mixed probability vector; (c) the starting
level of incompetence S3 where S3 is sufficiently close to the identity matrix. 65
4.7 Game flow for the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with (a) λ = 0.1, (b) λ = 0.2,
(c) λ = 0.226, (d) λ = 0.3, (e) λ = 1. Here, the only fixed point denoted
by a red circle is pushed from the vertex x2 to the interior of the simplex
as λ→ 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 Marine bacterial scheme of decision making depending on noisy environ-
mental measurements, adapted from [51]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
xiii
5.2 A scheme of equipment used by E.coli for chemotaxis, adapted from [120]. 87
5.3 Model predictions for different configurations of parameters. Here, we see
how different configurations of the parameters p,m and c determine the
stability of the strategies. The cost of swimming c has a critical value of
0.5 that determines the stability of the nonmotile strategy: if the cost of
swimming is too high, the more efficient nonmotile strategy becomes at-
tractive. Also, there is a threshold of m = c− 1
2
which leaves the nonmotile
strategy as the only reasonable choice for foraging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.4 Model predictions for different environments where the red circle corre-
sponds to a stable equilibrium of the game flow: (a) scarcity of resources:
m = 0.2, p = 0.5, c = 0.75, (b) patchiness of resources: m = 0.7, p = 0.25,
c = 0.1, (c) turbulent conditions: m = 0.5, p = 0.25, c = 0.75, (d) abun-
dant conditions: m = 0.25, p = 0.75, c = 0.25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 Model predictions for different regions of the water column based on the
environmental conditions, adapted from [24]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6 Adaptation in different environments: (a) learning adaptation function
λ(t), (b) population dynamics for patchiness of resources, (c) population
dynamics for scarcity of resources, (d) population dynamics for turbulent
conditions, (e) population dynamics for abundant conditions. . . . . . . . . 97
5.7 Adaptation in different environments: (a) learning adaptation function
λ(t), (b) population dynamics for patchiness of resources, (c) population
dynamics for scarcity of resources, (d) population dynamics for turbulent
conditions, (e) population dynamics for abundant conditions. . . . . . . . . 99
xiv
5.8 Different forms of behavioural randomization and its effect on the popu-
lation dynamics: (a)–(c) deterministic learning process, (d)–(f) stochastic
adaptation process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
xv
List of Notation
N the total number of players
n the total number of strategies
Sn a probability simplex
E(x, y) an expected reward for a strategy x against a strategy y
R a reward/fitness matrix
det(R) a determinant of a matrix R
R(λ) an incompetent reward/fitness matrix
R˜(λ) the canonical form of the incompetent reward/fitness matrix
λ an incompetence parameter
λc a critical value of the incompetence parameter
λu a maximal critical value of the incompetence parameter
λ(t) a learning function
Q(λ) an incompetence matrix
S a starting level of an incompetence matrix
xvi
F a final level of an incompetence matrix
I an identity matrix
Γ1 a fully competent game
Γλ a λ-fixed incompetent game
Γλ(t) a λ(t)-varying incompetent game
fi the fitness of the strategy i
φ the mean fitness of the population
x˙, g(x) the replicator dynamics
g(x, λ) the incompetent replicator dynamics for a fixed λ
g(x, λ(t)), g(x, t) the incompetent replicator dynamics for the learning function λ(t)
∇g(x) the Jacobian matrix of the replicator dynamics
x˜ a critical point of the replicator dynamics
X˜ a diagonal matrix with x˜ on the diagonal
V (x) a Lyapunov function
ei the ith member of a unit basis
1 a column vector of ones
J a square matrix of ones
xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1859 in the seminal treatise The origin of species [22] Charles Darwin introduced
the theory that describes a likely trajectory of evolution: he postulated that all species
living on Earth evolve from pre-existing species and have descended from a common
ancestor. This idea revolutionised science and society and many scientists continued
Darwin’s work; see for example [25, 33, 47, 48, 125]. Darwin’s work was applied in different
fields, from understanding of evolution in a biological context to models in mathematics,
social sciences, ecology, linguistics, telecommunications, and many other fields.
One interesting application of this is to the field lying at the intersection of game theory
and the theory of evolution, which is called evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game
theory, first introduced in 1973 by Maynard Smith and Price [110], analyses interactions
between different populations of animals or their offspring during their lives, and has since
become an area of ongoing research [14, 55, 110, 129]. It aims to answer the important
ecological and biological question of which population (or strategy) is the most stable
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from invasion by mutants.
All organisms on this planet live in a dynamic environment that undergoes changes. Thus,
the ability to adapt becomes a key to survival and the adaptation of species to a con-
stantly changing environment is of long-standing interest in biology. Usually, adaptation
is considered as a mutation process, which improves survival skills and reproductive func-
tions of species. This includes two parts: genetic adaptation and behavioural learning.
This doctoral research aims to provide a novel approach to social adaptation processes in
new environments via investigating adaptive learning. This is achieved by introducing the
notion of incompetence, whereby players may be imperfect in executing their strategies.
That is, we combine the concept of incompetence with evolutionary population dynamics.
Hence, evolutionary dynamics are considered under the assumption that species improve
their level of competence according to a prescribed learning scheme.
In parallel to evolutionary game theory, the dynamical systems perspective is frequently
adopted via the analysis of the associated replicator equations [119]. The behaviour of the
replicator dynamics depends on initial conditions, parameters’ values, and the structure
of the payoff matrix, and has been extensively studied [14, 15, 96, 129]. However, there is
no existing research examining the behaviour of replicator dynamics under incompetence,
which reflects environmental uncertainty and its influence on individuals’ behaviour.
A classical assumption in evolutionary game theory is that any player in a game chooses a
strategy from a strategy set and executes it with probability one. However, this assump-
tion may be overly simplistic for a realistic model, because players might not be experts
in their preferred actions. For example, if a fight between a young lion and an aged lion
unfolds, we could not predict the real outcome of the game as the experienced lion may
be more skillful and less prone to errors than the young one, even if lacking in youthful
vigour. This corresponds to potential mistakes in executing strategies. Mathematically,
this means that the probability of executing a chosen strategy would be less than one.
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In the context of evolutionary games, the idea of allowing players to make errors is
not entirely new. It has been described in many different ways: as a mutation pro-
cess [45, 114], a process of language learning [68, 69, 97], different experimental learning
processes [38, 57, 87, 107], adaptation dynamics [77], and as environmental noise [12, 84].
In addition, the unpredictability of some model aspects (such as behavioural or environ-
mental “noise”) may be approximated by taking into consideration the perturbations of
different parameters. This approximation is also related to the idea of players who make
small errors, called “trembling hands” [106], and as a result of these effects, stability
of the equilibria is affected. An attempt to generalise perturbations caused by players’
mistakes, in the sense of behavioural errors in normal form games, was made by Beck
et al. in their paper Incompetence and impact of training in bi-matrix games [9], and in
Beck’s PhD thesis Incompetence, training and changing capabilities in game theory [10]
for matrix and bi-matrix stationary games.
Perhaps the most related idea to replicator dynamics under incompetence is that of
replicator-mutator dynamics [16, 97]. These dynamics capture selection process under
mutations of the ith player. That is, the mutation component comes only from the player
under consideration without any uncertainty on behalf of possible mutations of other
players. In the case of incompetence, we assume that all interacting agents are prone
to behavioural mistakes. Consequently, uncertainty is coming from all interacting sides
affecting the expected payoff. Another closely related idea is the idea of environmental
noise [34] where the uncertainty has a certain distribution. However, it is hard to model
a particular type of behavioural uncertainty in this way. Our concept of incompetence
models uncertainty caused by the behavioural randomness of interacting species. How-
ever, even though the process is random, the mathematical way of capturing the process
is structured. Moreover, any population type may obtain their own type of incompetence
and adaptation trajectory.
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Hence, we shall address three key questions:
• Do species that adapt at a fast-enough rate survive?
• If species arrive in a new environment and make significant mistakes (the level of
incompetence is very high), can all existing types be preserved from extinction?
• Can we apply this knowledge to a specific biological problem and answer a question
of what are the most efficient foraging strategies in marine bacteria?
1.2 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 2 we define basic concepts of game theory and evolutionary game theory. We
introduce the concept of incompetence in evolutionary dynamics and set the mathematical
framework for this doctoral research. In addition, we present a very brief overview of the
biology of marine bacteria and their foraging strategies.
We show that incompetence can change the result of the competition and evolutionary
dynamics. Specifically, we define bifurcations in the replicator dynamics, which depend
on the incompetence parameter and which violate evolutionary stability of the population
dynamics depending on species learning. This underscores importance of learning within
what are inherently imperfect natural systems. We define a maximal critical value of the
incompetence parameter after which populations reach an evolutionary stable state.
Next, we consider the time-dependent adaptation process in which the incompetence of
species is changing with time. We have studied two cases for the functional form of the
adaptation function: sigmoid (or individual) learning and periodic (or environmental)
forcing. In the case with individual learning, we define a critical time after which species
reach their evolutionary stable state. When incorporating periodic environmental forc-
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ing, we demonstrate that in periodic environments evolutionary stability is possible and,
moreover, may imply periodicity in population dynamics.
Furthermore, we define a new concept of learning advantages. While it may appear
counter-intuitive at first, we shall say that strategies that are prone to mistakes have a
learning advantage. By saying this we mean that, via mistakes, species may obtain bene-
fits of randomising their behavioural patterns. This may enhance their chance to survive
invasions of mutants and some strategies could be adopted faster than others. In some
games, this means that species are able to execute strategies required by the environ-
mental conditions. This ability may be crucial when we consider changing environments
where the ability to adapt becomes particularly important. Hence, a degree of incompe-
tence may constitute either an evolutionary disadvantage or an advantage. However, this
depends strongly on the interplay among learning dynamics, learning advantages, and
fitness advantages. We further show that the latter may lead to the evolutionarily weak
phase where even evolutionary stable populations become vulnerable to invasions.
We then apply this concept to the foraging strategies of marine bacteria to investigate
how their optimal foraging depends on environmental shifts and species’ behavioural ran-
domisation. Marine bacteria are among the most abundant species in the ocean and are
affecting many key processes in the environment. Hence, understanding how cells inter-
act is a significant question that still remains unanswered. Application of game theory to
microbial interactions is appealing as that theory can be experimentally verified due to
rapid rates of bacterial evolution. We use evolutionary game theory to investigate how
bacterial motility and chemotaxis provide a competitive edge in different environments.
This may change as bacteria behaviourally adapt to their environmental conditions. We
predict optimal foraging strategies for different environmental conditions. We show that
the ability to randomise behavioural patterns becomes essential when we consider highly
unstable environmental conditions, for example, turbulent layer of the ocean waters.
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Chapter 2
Incompetence and microbial games
2.1 Game Theory
Modern Game Theory as a mathematical field was established in 1928 when John von
Neumann published his manuscript “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele” [95] in which he
analysed a strategic game of N players assuming that each player is rational and interested
in optimising their personal interaction outcome. This manuscript became a first step in a
long history of the field that was successfully applied in economics, social sciences, biology,
computer sciences, and many others. In order to arrive at a better understanding of game
theory, let us first define a game itself and its components which we will use further in
our analysis.
2.1.1 Games and strategies
Almost any interaction in human societies, animal populations, or nature that involves
decision making can be described as a game. A strategic game can be defined as a
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description of strategic interactions between participants (formally referred as players)
given available actions and consequences of these actions (formally referred as rewards or
payoffs) [100]. When taking a game-theoretic approach, we usually assume that players
are rational and have knowledge or expectations about other players’ decisions.
Let us first introduce some notation for the games that will be used in this thesis:
• Actions: each player k = 1, . . . , N may choose an action ai ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , n
available in a game. In our context A is independent of k.
• Strategies: player k’s strategy is a probability distribution over a set of actions.
Thus player k chooses a strategy from their strategy space
Sk :=
{
s ∈ Rn |
n∑
i=1
si = 1, si ≥ 0
}
.
A strategy is mixed if at least two actions are assigned a non-zero probability, and
completely mixed when all actions are played with positive probability. A pure
strategy has a form of a unit basis vector ei and reflects selection of action i.
• Payoffs: we define payoffs as associated utility to each strategy in a game. This is
usually described by the payoff function for a player k, namely, Ek : Sk → R. In
game-theoretic settings players strive to maximise their utility. In this thesis, we
consider games with two interacting players. We shall refer to their payoffs as a
reward matrix R = [rij], i, j = 1, . . . , n, where n is a number of available strategies
and each entry rij is a payoff to player 1 when playing against player 2. Player 2
obtains their payoffs according to the reward matrix RT , where RT is the transpose
of R.
If all players cooperated for the sake of maximising their aggregate utility, the problem
would merely be an optimisation problem but would lose its competitive character. The
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focus on non-cooperative and competitive individual utility maximisation clearly requires
a more refined solution concept.
2.1.2 Equilibria in games
When analysing a game usually we look for an equilibrium solution. An equilibrium
solution implies that players prefer to utilise this solution as it provides the best payoffs
given the game constraints and behaviour of other decision-makers. The classical concept
of game-theoretic equilibria is a Nash equilibrium. Let us denote by S−k := S\Sk the
set of all strategies available to players other than player k, where k = 1, . . . , N . Then
a Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S such that, for all players
k = 1, . . . , N , the expected payoff from s∗, Ek(s∗k, s
∗
−k), is greater than the reward from
any other strategy, that is
Ek(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) ≥ Ek(sk, s∗−k) ∀sk ∈ Sk, k = 1, . . . , N, (2.1)
where s∗−k ∈ S−k is merely s∗ with the kth player’s entry deleted. We shall say that the
equilibrium is a strict Nash equilibrium if there is a strict inequality in (2.1).
In a classical sense, each player chooses an action (a pure strategy) and that choice results
in a deterministic payoff. That is, there is an underlying assumption that players are able
to execute the actions that they have chosen. However, if we consider tennis players,
we may see that this may not be the case: a player who has just started their training
has a higher chance of making mistakes than a professional player. We may refer to this
phenomenon as a player’s incompetence. In the next section we introduce this concept
more formally.
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2.1.3 Incompetence
The classical, but implicit, assumption of game theory is that players execute their chosen
actions with probability one. However, when incompetence is introduced this may no
longer be the case as different players may have different skills and experience [10]. To
incorporate incompetence, let us now consider a bimatrix game between two players.
We shall adapt the incompetence notation from [10] to the case that will be important in
evolutionary games. Incompetence is incorporated into the game by assigning probabilities
that the actions selected by players will not coincide with the executed actions. The
set of all such probabilities determines the incompetence matrix for each player. Let
q(aj|ai) be the probability that player 1 executes action aj given that he selects action
ai. For any chosen action, the probabilities of all possible executed actions sum to 1,
that is
∑n
j=1 q(aj|ai) = 1, ∀i = 1, ..., n, and 0 ≤ q(aj|ai) ≤ 1, ∀i, j. The set of all these
probabilities for player 1 makes up their incompetence matrix Q:
Q =

q(a1|a1) q(a2|a1) ... q(an|a1)
q(a1|a2) q(a2|a2) ... q(an|a2)
...
...
. . .
...
q(a1|an) q(a2|an) ... q(an|an)
 . (2.2)
Note that Q is a row-stochastic matrix. In our application we assume that the incompe-
tence matrix for the second player is the transpose matrix of Q, as both of them are from
the same population.
Now, we can construct a matrix game with incompetence. Suppose that the two players
independently select actions i and k. The probability that this choice results in executed
actions j and h respectively is
p(aj, ah|ai, ak) = q(aj|ai)q(ah|ak).
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In order to simplify the notation, instead of q(aj|ai), we will now use the notation qij. The
expected reward can therefore be determined as a function of the selectable strategies as
rQik =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
p(aj, ah|ai, ak)rjh =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
qijqkhrjh, (2.3)
and the values rQik define the entries of the payoff matrix R
Q.
The matrix form of (2.3) gives the relationship
RQ = QRQT . (2.4)
To define players’ incompetence, we introduce an incompetence parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] which
measures the training progress of players on the trajectory from the “starting” level of
incompetence, S, to the “final” level of incompetence, F . These trajectories may have
any functional form depending on the game settings. In order to simplify the analysis we
shall initially consider the linear trajectory:
Q(λ) = (1− λ)S + λF, λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.5)
Here both S and F are also row-stochastic matrices. In some cases, F will be an identity
matrix indicating the final level of full competence. We use R(λ) := RQ(λ) from (2.4).
Note that R(0) = SRST , R(1) = FRF T , and hence R(1) = R if F = I. While we
interpret (2.5) as reducing the level of incompetence (as λ moves from 0 to 1), some
readers may prefer to view it as the process of increasing competence.
Remark. Note that it would also be possible to refer to the level of competence as
the level of skill of a player. However, we continue to use the incompetence terminology
introduced in Beck et al. [9].
10
2.2 Evolutionary game theory
2.2.1 Evolution as a game
Distribution and abundance of organisms is a key question in ecology. While we share this
planet with millions of different species, they are not spread randomly. What factors lead
to new niches emerging and new species appearing? How do entire populations survive?
These questions motivate the ongoing research on evolution and selection.
Evolutionary game theory appeared as a field on the interface between evolutionary bi-
ology and game theory in 1973 [110] aimed to answer these questions. It was proposed
that instead of considering individuals as players who may not be rational, the selection
itself could be considered as a rational force of evolution. Then, the evolution of species’
behaviours is driven by selection pressure and this leads us to the Darwinian hypothesis
of survival of the fittest.
Let us consider a game in evolutionary settings. Consider a single population of species
that interact with n behavioural strategies to choose from. In terminology of classic
game theory, we shall consider each individual in the population as a player which has
n available actions. In evolutionary games, we focus on predicting frequencies of each
behavioural type that is adopted by the population. Hence, all possible mixtures of
behavioural frequencies are trapped in the simplex Sn such that
Sn =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xn)|
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
where xi =
Ni
N
with Ni being a number of individuals adopting strategy i and N being a
total number of individuals in the population. We say that the population adopts a pure
ith strategy if all individuals are behaving as the ith type and, hence, their behavioural
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frequency vector is the unit basis vector ei. However, this may not always be the case.
If not, we are in the case of mixed strategies x, and hence we are interested in finding a
mixture x˜ which is a stable outcome of the evolution.
2.2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategy
When considering problems in evolutionary game theory, an important concept is that
of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Maynard Smith and Price [110] introduced
an assumption that player decision-making does not have to be rational. Instead, they
considered a population of players interacting in nature: each animal of some type meets
another animal (of the same or different type) and the game occurs. The game here is
introduced as a payoff matrix, R, where each element is the value of resources or changes
in fitness accruing to the participants.
As a solution concept for such games, Maynard Smith introduced an ESS [109]. Using
the classical notation, let us explore a game with the set of strategies S = {s1, s2, ..., sn};
the expected payoff for each strategy si versus strategy sj is then given by E(si, sj). The
strategy si is called an ESS if one of the following conditions holds:
E(si, si) > E(sj, si), ∀j 6= i (2.6)
or
E(si, si) = E(sj, si) and E(si, sj) > E(sj, sj). (2.7)
Thus, in the long run, an ESS guarantees that selection prefers si instead of sj. Note
that condition (2.6) is very similar to the Nash equilibrium condition (2.1). Indeed, an
ESS is a special case of Nash equilibrium [96]. However, besides equilibria, we are usually
interested in how these equilibria can be reached. In other words, we are interested in
evolutionary dynamics of populations.
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2.2.3 Replicator dynamics
There are many approaches for establishing long-run scenarios for evolutionary games.
A fundamental set of replicator equations was proposed by Taylor and Jonker in [119].
Consider the fitness matrix R = [rij], i, j = 1, . . . , n. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi
denotes the frequency of strategy i. Then the expected payoff (or fitness) of strategy i is
defined by the formula
fi =
n∑
j=1
xjrij = e
T
i Rx = (Rx)i. (2.8)
The mean fitness payoff of the population is then defined by the scalar
φ =
n∑
i=1
xifi = x
TRx. (2.9)
We would like to capture the notion that the higher fitness of a strategy i in comparison
to the mean fitness of the entire population, the more advantageous it is to the evolution
of species. The appealing replicator equation capturing the dynamics of the strategy i is
then postulated to be
x˙i = xi(fi − φ), i = 1, ..., n,
or in a matrix form,
x˙i = xi
(
(Rx)i − xTRx
)
, i = 1, ..., n. (2.10)
In evolutionary game theory it is customary to omit the initial conditions xi(0) normally
accompanying ordinary differential equations such as (2.10).
The fundamental theorem of evolutionary game theory predicts that any stable outcome
of the selection has to be a strict Nash equilibrium. The result is called the Folk Theorem
and is stated below.
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Theorem 2.2.1 [55] The replicator equation for a matrix game on the simplex Sn satis-
fies:
1. A stable fixed point is a Nash equilibrium.
2. A convergent trajectory in the interior of Sn evolves to a Nash equilibrium.
3. A strict Nash equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
Hence, it is possible to predict the stable outcome of the selection by analysing the static
matrix game equilibria. Furthermore, we know that the ESS is a local asymptotically
stable fixed point of the replicator equation, and it is globally stable when the ESS lies in
the interior of Sn, that is, xi > 0, ∀i. These results are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2 [119] If x˜ is an ESS, x˜ is asymptotically stable. If x˜ ∈ int(Sn) with
int(Sn) being the interior of Sn, then x˜ is globally stable.
In addition, we recall the theorem stating that an ESS persists under small perturbations.
Theorem 2.2.3 [15] Let x˜ be a regular ESS for R. For arbitrary  > 0 there is a δ > 0
such that, for every R′ with ||R′ −R|| < δ, there is an ESS x˜′ for R′ with ||x˜′ − x˜|| < .
2.3 Evolutionary dynamics under incompetence
Let us now consider how probabilities of mistakes may describe interaction errors in an
evolutionary context. At first, one can imagine that a particular population of species is
immersed into a new environment; this could be described by a natural or anthropogenic
migration process. Assume that there are only a finite number, n, of available behavioural
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strategies for each species. Two individuals interact by choosing and executing strategies,
and achieve payoffs, defined by the n × n matrix R. Next, we also assume that each
individual may choose any action from the available set of strategies. We assume that
they make errors in the new habitat, executing different strategies from the ones that
they chose, with probabilities qij, where i and j are varying from 1 to n. The set of all
conditional probabilities qij for the population makes up its incompetence matrix Q from
(2.2).
Thus, whenever two individuals interact, they may both change their behaviour from one
strategy to another during the execution of play. Assume that both opponents are able
to determine each other’s selected strategy. This is a natural assumption as species are
able to “recognize” other species’ behaviour by their body language. However, even if
the opponent has chosen one particular strategy, there is a chance for them to execute
another strategy according to their experience or their competence in strategy choice.
Hence, each species from the population achieves an expected payoff for chosen strategy
i whenever their opponent chooses strategy k according to (2.3) or, in simplified notation
rik(λ) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
qij(λ)qhk(λ)rjh, i, k = 1, .., n,
where qij(λ) denotes the (i, j)
th entry of Q(λ).
Now we can introduce the adaptation dynamics into the evolution of the population. Here,
the adaptation process of a population to a new environment can be constructed as inter-
actions between the environment’s individuals, which over time reduce their probabilities
of making errors, that is, as λ changes from 0 to 1. Then, according to (2.8)-(2.10), for a
new matrix game under incompetence given by R(λ), one may write down the following
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equations of the expected fitness for strategy i,
fi(λ) =
n∑
j=1
rij(λ)xj = e
T
i R(λ)x, (2.11)
and for the mean fitness payoff of the population,
φ(λ) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(λ) = x
TR(λ)x. (2.12)
Hence, the replicator dynamics are given by
x˙i = xi(fi(λ)− φ(λ)), i = 1, ..., n,
or in a matrix form
x˙i = xi
(
(R(λ)x)i − xTR(λ)x
)
. (2.13)
Thus we obtain a dynamic system (2.13), where R(λ) is quadratic in λ. An important
feature of these systems is that the time scale of replicator dynamics for x(t) might not
coincide with the time scale of adaptation dynamics for λ. This means that individuals
may study the environment much faster or much slower than they reproduce. Indeed, in
Chapter 3, we begin our analysis of the dynamics of the system with λ fixed, with the
goal of discovering the underlying effect of the incompetence parameter. The subsequent
analysis of the time-dependent adaptation trajectories is also discussed in Chapter 4.
In a strict sense, the new system given by (2.13) is a perturbed evolutionary game, and
perturbations depend on the parameter λ. As λ tends to 1 the game under incompetence
approaches the original game given by R.
16
2.4 Learning versus incompetence
The idea of learning in evolutionary games is not entirely new. Fudenberg and Levine in
their book [38] introduced an idea that animals in population games can learn the game
rules through repetitions of the game. They assumed that players develop best response
strategies, which deliver a maximum payoff, and adopt these strategies once they master
them. Learning became very popular and many models were introduced to describe such
dynamics. In Selten [107], three kinds of learning were identified:
1. Rote learning, where the probabilities of choosing a particular strategy are influenced
by success and failure from the past experience of the player,
2. Imitation, where the probabilities are determined by successful strategies of other
players,
3. Belief learning, which is very different and has an indirect influence on the strategy
choice.
The concept of learning seems to be a good approximation to systems where players do not
have much information about the rules or the best responses. It assumes that players learn
and gain experience through repetitions of the same, fixed, game. Such learning within
the given game does not allow agents an opportunity to acquire and achieve experience
from other games. However, the concept of incompetence need not have such a restriction
[10] as players may participate in different games. For example, animals might interact
with different populations over their lifetime and gain experience that improves their
survival skills. Thus, incompetence may be expected to allow animals to adapt to their
environment.
One closely related idea to the one of incompetence is that of a Quantal Response Equilib-
rium (QRE). The latter was introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey [87] in 1995 and is based
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on players who make mistakes when choosing their strategies. Experience was suggested
as an obvious interpretation of QRE in the models, as players are expected to make fewer
mistakes through the repeated experience of one game. McKelvey and Palfrey introduced
a statistical reaction function σij(u¯), which is the probability that player i selects strategy
j given utility function u¯, and verified that this function is monotonically increasing in
the utility function, that is,
u¯ij > u¯ik ⇒ σij(u¯) > σik(u¯).
However, as was shown for the example in [10], the strict monotonicity of the probability
of choosing an action, measured by the incompetence parameter, on the value of the game
does not always hold.
Another, more significant, difference between QRE and incompetence is that QRE oper-
ates with the probabilistic function of Logit equilibrium in the learning system, which is
given by
piij =
eνxij∑Ni
k=1 e
νxik
, (2.14)
where xij = u¯ij(pi) and Ni is the number of pure strategies in the game for a player i. Here,
the parameter ν characterises the level of experience for the players: when ν = 0 players
always make mistakes, whereas ν →∞ means no mistakes occur. It was shown that the
Logit equilibrium tends to a Nash equilibrium [87]. On the other hand, trajectories from
the starting level of incompetence S to the final level F can assume any functional form
depending on the game, for example,
Q(λ) = (1− λ)S + λF, (2.15)
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or
Q(t) =
(
1− 1
1 + e−t
)
S +
1
1 + e−t
F. (2.16)
Furthermore, by the construction of the equilibrium function, ν = 0 in (2.14) means
that players are absolutely inexperienced and their actions are chosen according to non-
informative uniform distribution. Thus, they make their choice with equal probability
for any strategy. In the case of incompetence, λ = 0 in (2.15) implies that each player
starts with their own probabilistic measure to make mistakes, which is the starting level
of incompetence, namely, a row of matrix S. The latter is not necessarily the same for
each strategy. However, the meaning of λ and ν here is quite close to the one that we use
for incompetence: it is a measure of the player’s experience or competence.
One more thing to mention is that ideas of QRE and incompetence encounter the same
problem when applied to the population games: these games with either QRE or incom-
petence are homogeneous, that is, they imply that players from one population have the
same level of probabilities of errors. This arises in the case of dynamic population games
as we deal with the estimation of the experience for the whole population, but we do not
measure the impact of individuals. However, this problem was solved for the case with
heterogeneous agents in [42, 88] for the QRE, and these results could be used to improve
incompetent population games in the future.
The QRE is widely used for different approaches of learning: social learning [20], selection
[70] and altruism modelling [78], strategic information transmission [18], bargaining [128],
and many others. Nevertheless, the learning process can be studied as replicator dynamics
with noise [57]. Consequently, the incompetence, as constructed in examples above, may
characterise these perturbations of the replicator equations.
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2.5 Evolutionary game theory applications
Maynard Smith wrote in the preface to his book “paradoxically, it has turned out that
game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of economic behaviour for
which it was originally designed” [109].
Additionally, evolutionary game theory found its application in explanations of many
phenomena in human behaviour and in nature: biological altruism [122], empathy [101],
human culture [28, 29], signalling systems and other proto-linguistic behaviour [98, 60],
social learning [103], and others. Biologists applied game theory not only to study the
evolution of populations, but also to study animal communication [49]. The analysis of
such games led to the understanding of the evolution of communication among animals.
Another example is the evolution of fairness in the game called “divide the cake” which
was introduced by Skyrms in [108]. Two individuals have to divide the resource of size
C and they can choose any strategy, that is, any amount of the resource. However, if the
sum of both requested amounts is greater than C, then nobody will get anything. Skyrms
constructed an evolutionary model and applied evolutionary dynamics to conclude that
in the sense of evolution and survival, animals are more likely to cooperate and share in
the situations with limited resources.
One more application of evolutionary game theory is telecommunications [3]. An interest-
ing feature of such games is that there is a very large population of decision makers who
have to interact and take some actions. In the sense of evolutionary games, researchers
focus on the target audience, for example on the users of some social network such as
Facebook or Twitter. They have only two possible actions: share the content and not
share the content. Then, there is a mixed strategy of the original population, x, and a
mixed strategy of mutants, x∗. If the strategy of the original population is an ESS, then
by (2.6)
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E(x,x) > E(x∗,x),
and the mutation frequency decreases over time if x is immune to mutations. If we deal
with the weak ESS, which, by (2.7), is specified by:
E(x,x) = E(x∗,x), E(x,x∗) > E(x∗,x∗),
then x is “weakly” immune against mutations. Thus incidental interactions between the
original population and mutants will occur and the condition
E(x,x∗) > E(x∗,x∗)
guarantees that the growth rate of the original population exceeds that of mutants. Au-
thors in [3] refer to [104] as an application of evolutionary game theory to congestion
problems.
As a final example, conflicts between animals occur over time and the survival of animals
depends on their energy strategies. That is, an animal that avoids starvation is fit and
may survive. This biological concept in the sense of the energy-saving strategy in networks
is considered in [89, 94].
2.6 Microbial interactions as evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory has also been applied to microbiology. One of the aims of
microbiology is to analyse bacterial interactions and predict the evolution of populations
under specific conditions. Marine bacteria are among the most abundant species in the
ocean [91]. They may affect many aspects of our lives: from causing disease to promoting
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health and shaping many key processes in the environment. Understanding how cells
make decisions and interact has implications for both biology of bacterial communities
and our exploitation of these communities. Bacteria often form biofilms, that is, they
arrange into dense multi-species entities. In these dense populations individual cells have
to compete for nutrients, cooperate by providing different advantages/disadvantages to
neighbours, and do this while taking into account environmental conditions.
As the main aim of the ecological competition is to maximise the fitness of the population,
this makes bacterial communities a perfect candidate for applying evolutionary game
theory [1, 36, 37, 72, 76, 79]. Evolutionary game theory has been applied to studies of
cyclic competition, respiration versus fermentation processes, cooperation (also known as
public goods games), cross feeding, signalling, and parasite versus host interactions in
bacterial communities. Furthermore, Hummert et al. [59] emphasise that the potential
of this application in cell biology is currently underestimated. Game theory applied to
microbial interactions provides a conceptual understanding of interacting populations [76]
and can be experimentally verified due to rapid rates of bacterial evolution [43].
However, a deterministic game theoretic approach misses an essential feature of the bacte-
rial population dynamics: these populations and their interactions are highly stochastic.
Hence, random fluctuations may affect ecological systems [37]. In order to at least partially
allow for this, we are utilising the concept of incompetence in microbial communities, by
incorporating behavioural stochasticity in our game-theoretic deterministic model. Nev-
ertheless, even though most of the models were applied to explain cooperative behaviour
in interacting populations, Hein at al. [51] suggest that a game-theoretic approach can
also be applied to foraging, specifically, in marine bacteria.
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2.6.1 Marine bacteria and their foraging strategies
Acquisition of resources within competitive environments is a crucial component of eco-
logical success. Despite their primitivism and small sizes, marine bacteria are among the
most ubiquitous forms of marine organisms, playing a central role in governing the health
of marine ecosystems and regulating the global biosphere. Fundamental to nutrient com-
petition among bacteria is the choice of motile and chemotactic strategies. Chemotaxis
— the ability to sense environmental signals, and react to the stimuli accordingly — has
been studied since the late 1800s [27, 102]. There is a vast literature covering a multitude
of experiments and mathematical approaches to modelling motility and chemotactic com-
petition between oligotrophs and copiotrophs. However, there is a gap in our knowledge
on how natural selection induces this competition on the evolutionary scale. For example,
although chemotaxis appears to be an efficient way to explore new spaces, not all marine
bacteria are chemotactic. Yet, under certain conditions, they dominate: 90% of species
forming harmful algal blooms will swim along chemical gradients [23].
The heterogeneity of the physical and chemical surrounds in the ocean gives rise to con-
tinual spatial and temporal fluctuations in nutrient conditions. Cells experience a range
of challenges, from the presence of toxins to the physical effects of Brownian rotational
diffusion. In order to survive, microbes must find their niche and adapt to the variability.
Under turbulent conditions, due to the water mixing and increased frequencies of Brown-
ian rotational diffusion, bacteria will diversify their reactions to the environmental signals
[118]. Chemotaxis is favoured under intermediate levels of turbulence as motile cells sense
gradients and are able to benefit from travelling along them for enhanced nutrient uptake.
Bacteria also have mechanisms decreasing the costs of flagella biosynthesis and activation
when they are solely flicking at high speeds [113]. Such adaptation mechanisms represent
an efficient strategy for acquiring resources and the fraction of motile cells may rise to
be as high as 60% [64]. However, in highly turbulent environments, chemotaxis loses its
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efficiency as the cost of motility drastically increases and the gradients change or vanish
faster than the cell can respond [118]. Marine cells also react rapidly to chemical changes
such as nutrient enrichments, which can change the entire community composition in sev-
eral hours [115]. As a consequence, the abundance of copiotrophs is higher in the coastal
waters than the open ocean [115, 113]. Thus, bacteria select their foraging strategy in
consideration of many internal and external factors in order to maximise their fitness for
specific environmental conditions [115].
Mathematical models have been proposed to explain the optimal foraging strategies of
microorganisms [51]. However, there is still no universal model that explores and justifies
what conditions lead to which optimality [51, 115, 113]. Hein et al. [51] proposed that
evolutionary game theory might provide insights to the foraging strategies of marine cells
as it provides a conceptual theoretical explanation of the competition process. Evolu-
tionary game theory was proposed by Maynard Smith [110] and has been widely applied
to biological phenomena since its inception in 1973. However, analysis of microbial in-
teractions as a game is more recent, and still mostly directed towards gaining a better
understanding of bacterial cooperation [37, 126, 67]. Yet, game theoretical analysis would
also be a suitable method for improving our understanding of bacterial competition. In
addition, a game-theoretic approach has a significant advantage as it can be constructed
in a cost-benefit framework, which is required for understanding foraging strategies [115].
When adapting for a specific strategy, such as chemotaxis, organisms should utilise motil-
ity only when it is necessary [115]. Different environments may lead to local adaptation,
that is, a single species may have genetic differences according to their immediate sur-
rounds in order to generate suitable behaviours for their location [17, 65]. In other words,
gene mutations may generate behavioural strategies tailored to specific environments.
Shifts in the environment may also force changes in social behaviour for genetically iden-
tical species [127]. In addition, even when considering a single environment and identical
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genes, not all organisms react in the same way [35]. These divergences may influence the
result of the winning foraging strategy, provide new niches for bacteria, and provide a
redundancy to retain multiple strategies at a population level. Stocker (2012) commented
on the complex interplay between variable strategy choices within changeable environ-
ments by stating: “What strategies do marine bacteria adopt to optimise foraging and
fitness? Might only a minority of cells stumble upon the right combination of nutrient
patches and survive, i.e., is the mean motile bacterium a dead bacterium?” [115].
In Chapter 5 we use evolutionary game theory to investigate an optimal foraging strategy
for marine bacteria under differing conditions. This is achieved by combining the con-
cepts of differing foraging strategies generated by dissimilar genes, as well as behavioural
strategy choices driven by reactions of microorganisms to their environment. We also
examine how the randomisation of social behaviour may help marine bacteria diversify
their reactions and survive even in highly heterogeneous environments. Going further,
we explore how bacteria adapt to the environmental fluctuations under randomisation of
their reactions.
25
Publications included in Chapter 3
The next chapter is based on the published paper:
Kleshnina M., Filar J.A., Ejov V. and McKerral J.C. Evolutionary games under incom-
petence. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 77(3):627– 646, 2018.
Authors have contributed as follows:
Contributor Statement of contribution
Author: M. Kleshnina (Candidate) 1) conception and design of the project;
2) analysis and interpretation of the research;
3) drafting significant parts of the publication.
Author: J.A. Filar 1) conception and design of the project;
2) analysis and interpretation of the research;
3) editing significant parts of the publication.
Author: V. Ejov 1) analysis and interpretation of the research.
Author: J.C. McKerral 1) analysis and interpretation of the research;
2) editing significant parts of the publication.
Column two of the above table lists the component(s) of the research to which the named
co-author has significantly contributed.
MK and JAF designed the project. MK performed the analysis and composed the initial
draft of the manuscript. MK, JAF and JCM interpreted the results. JAF and VE also
contributed to the analysis and various proofs. JAF and JCM have critically reviewed
the publication. JAF edited multiple versions of the manuscript.
26
Chapter 3
Incompetence in evolutionary games
3.1 Motivating example: a Hawk-Dove game
In his book [109], Maynard Smith analysed an iconic example of evolutionary game theory
called “The Hawk-Dove game”. In this game, the interaction between two bird types, of
Hawk (H) and Dove (D), is observed. The payoff matrix is given by
R =
Hawk Dove

Hawk b−c
2
b
Dove 0 b
2
.
In a generic interaction, these birds need to divide some resource of value b, for example,
territory or food. If they are both from the Hawk population, then they fight and lose
some resource of value c, perhaps representing a cost of injury, and divide the rest of the
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resource in half. If they are both Dove, then they simply divide the resource without any
losses. If Hawk and Dove interact, then Hawk captures the resource and Dove receives
nothing.
The first row and column correspond to the Hawk strategy while the second row and
column denote the Dove strategy. It is a well-studied example and it was shown that the
result depends on the payoff matrix R. In particular, if the price of injury is high, then
stable coexistence is possible. Otherwise, we obtain the situation where the aggressive
strategy dominates the passive one.
One particular example to illustrate this game is an interaction between a naturally
aggressive person and a passive one. It can be easily imagined that the passive person is
inclined to be scared and might run away when he or she becomes a victim of aggression.
Obviously, a fight in response to the aggression is not the action that is expected from
the passive type. On the other hand, the aggressive person is expected to fight no matter
what the circumstances are. However, we might observe that in some cases the passive
person could fight back with extra aggression, whereas the aggressive person can become
frightened and run away. Such behavioural unpredictability may be more likely when
players are in a new environment with which they are unfamiliar.
Next, we construct an incompetent case of the Hawk-Dove game with the reward ma-
trix R(λ) calculated from (2.3)–(2.4). Consider the case when stable coexistence of two
strategies is possible with b = 2 and c = 4. Then,
R =
Hawk Dove

Hawk −1 2
Dove 0 1
.
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Here Dove and Hawk stably coexist and there exists a unique stable frequency of Hawks,
xH , which is given by xH =
b
c
= 1
2
. This derived as a solution of the equation x˙H = 0
with application of the stability analysis, see [109].
The above game is described via one payoff matrix for both players: for the first player the
matrix is R, and for the second player the matrix is RT , and if we assume that players from
the same population are equally incompetent, then the incompetence matrix Q captures
players’ level of incompetence (see (2.2)). We use MAPLE 2016.1 for symbolic matrix
calculations in the examples reported in this thesis. Consider the starting incompetence
level S to be of a particular type (we explain our choice in Section 3.2),
S =
 0.3 0.7
0.6 0.4
 ,
and obtain Q(λ) from (2.2):
Q(λ) =
 0.7λ+ 0.3 0.7− 0.7λ
0.6− 0.6λ 0.6λ+ 0.4
 .
We use a simplification of the reward matrix with 0 on the diagonal from
R˜(λ) = R(λ)− dR(λ)1T , (3.1)
where dR(λ) is a column vector consisting of the diagonal elements of R(λ), 1 is a column
vector of ones. This formula helps to simplify replicator dynamics as it is known that this
transformation does not affect the fixed points of the dynamics according to the following
result. Hence, we shall refer to R˜(λ) as the canonical form.
Theorem 3.1.1 [15, 54] Let k > 0, cj ∈ R, R˜ = [r˜ij], i, j = 1, . . . , n, with r˜ij = krij+cj.
Then
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1. The set of Nash equilibria for R is the same as the set of Nash equilibria for R˜.
2. x˜ is an ESS for R if and only if it is an ESS for R˜.
Since R(λ) = Q(λ)RQ(λ)T , the reward matrix R˜(λ) then can be written as
R˜(λ) =
 0 1.56λ2 − 0.62λ+ 0.06
1.82λ2 − 0.94λ+ 0.12 0
 .
It can be easily shown that there are three possible situations depending on the value of λ.
The first is where Hawk and Dove stably coexist: thus, there exists a stable equilibrium
xH =
6λ− 1
13λ− 3 ,
xD =
7λ− 2
13λ− 3
and this is the case for λ ∈ [0, 1
6
) ∪ (2
7
, 1]. We observe an interesting result when species
achieve the level of incompetence λ = 1
6
. Hawks become extinct and we obtain a popula-
tion consisting of all Doves. Hence, we enter the new interval λ ∈ [1
6
, 3
13
] where we obtain
a population consisting of all Doves, as this strategy dominates. However, mistakes give
Hawks a hope for rebirth as the probability of a Dove acting like a Hawk is
q21 = 0.6− 0.6λ.
For example, for λ = 0.2, a Dove will revive a Hawk strategy in 48% of cases. As players
learn more, λ enters the interval ( 3
13
, 2
7
] and a Hawk strategy becomes an ESS, meaning
that it is preferable and so the frequency of Hawks starts to grow rapidly. At λ = 2
7
we
expect to obtain a population consisting of all Hawks. This is a reverse situation to λ = 1
6
,
where Hawk acts like Dove in 50% of cases, which preserves the latter from extinction.
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As species keep learning, the system falls into the interval of λ > 2
7
where Hawk and Dove
stably coexist.
The Jacobian ∇(g) for this game has the form from (A.1) derived in Appendix A, which
in this simple example reduces to
∇(g)11 = −xD
(−1.56λ2 + 0.62λ− 0.06 + 6.76xHλ2 − 2.48xHλ+ 0.24xH) ,
∇(g)12 = x2H
(−3.38λ2 + 1.58λ− 0.18)+ xH (1.56λ2 − 0.62λ+ 0.06) ,
∇(g)21 = x2D
(−3.38λ2 + 1.58λ− 0.18)+ xD (1.82λ2 − 0.94λ+ 0.12) ,
∇(g)22 = −xH
(−1.82λ2 + 0.94λ− 0.12 + 6.76xDλ2 − 2.48xDλ+ 0.24xD) ,
and the determinant of ∇(g) changes signs at λc1 = 16 , λc2 = 313 and λc3 = 27 . However, the
determinant of R(λ) also changes signs whenever the incompetent parameter λ crosses its
critical values of λc1 =
1
6
, λc2 =
3
13
and λc3 =
2
7
.
3.2 Perturbations under incompetence
Let us first introduce some notation. Consider the replicator dynamics, x˙ = g(x), for the
case with full competence, that is, the original evolutionary game. We shall define this
game as a Γ1, the fully competent game
1:
Γ1 : x˙ = g(x, 1) = g(x), x(0) = x0. (3.2)
Further, we define a game with the fixed incompetence parameter, λ, as a λ-fixed incom-
1In (3.2)–(3.4), and elsewhere, we suppress the argument, t, of differentiation in line with common
practice in the field.
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petent game Γλ:
Γλ : x˙ = g(x, λ), x(0) = x0. (3.3)
Next, we shall call a game λ(t)-varying game Γλ(t) with λ being time-dependent as
Γλ(t) : x˙ = g (x, λ(t)) , x(0) = x0. (3.4)
In this section we provide results that give insights to understanding of the game dynamics
when incompetence is incorporated. We shall first provide some basic definitions we will
use later in our analysis.
Definition 3.2.1 [71] A fixed point of the replicator dynamics x˜ is called stable if all
real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at this point are negative.
Otherwise, such a point is called unstable.
Definition 3.2.2 [71] Two vector fields ψ1(t) and ψ2(t) are topologically equivalent near
x˜1 and x˜2, if there exist neighbourhoods N1 and N2 of x˜1 and x˜2 and a homeomorphism
h : N1 → N2 with h(x˜1) = x˜2, which maps each orbit of the first vector field in N1 onto
an orbit of the second vector field in N2, preserving the direction of time.
Definition 3.2.3 [71] For the reward matrix R the vector field ψ(t) of the replicator
dynamics is locally structurally stable around x˜ if there is an , such that for all matrices
R0 with ||R0−R|| < , the vector fields ψ(t) and ψ(t)0 are topologically equivalent around
x˜.
As has been illustrated in the Hawk-Dove example, there exist transition points on the
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adaptation trajectory that change qualitative characteristics of the system. Let us name
these points as critical values of the incompetence parameter.
Definition 3.2.4 A critical value of the incompetence parameter, λc, is a bifurcation
point of the replicator dynamics. Then, let Λ be the set of all such critical values of λ.
Bifurcation points occur in dynamics as singular points of the Jacobian matrix. However,
let us also define the set of values of the incompetence parameter when the determinant
of the reward matrix R˜(λ) equals zero.
Definition 3.2.5 Let Z =
{
λ ∈ [0, 1] | det(R˜(λ)) = 0
}
. We call it the set of singular
points of the incompetent game Γλ.
Note that Definition 3.2.4 and Definition 3.2.5 are not equivalent. For instance, it is
possible to find examples where only one of them is satisfied.
By the definition of a bifurcation, if the system is stable, then in the intervals between λc1
and λc2 the fixed points preserve their qualitative behaviour. That is, in order to under-
stand where the game experiences transitions, we want to find these critical values of the
incompetence parameter. Strictly speaking, fixed points of the incompetent replicator
dynamics depend on the incompetence parameter, that is x˜(λc). However, frequently,
we will use the simplified notation x˜. The fixed points of the replicator dynamics corre-
spond to the equilibrium points in a game-theoretic setting. Hence, when the dynamics
experience bifurcations, the game experiences transitions in its equilibria.
Let us first analyse a fixed point at the vertex i of the simplex Sn. According to [15] the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian for such points are 0 and r˜ji : j 6= i. Hence, when changes in
the incompetence parameter cause changes in the sign of the corresponding elements of
the payoff matrix R˜(λ) we observe changes in stability of such points.
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Next consider a fixed point on the edge, that is, a point x = αei + (1 − α)ek, where ei
and ek are unit basis vectors. At this fixed point we obtain only two surviving strategies.
Then, we can easily establish the following result.
Lemma 3.2.1 If:
(a) x˜ = αei + (1− α)ej, where α ∈ (0, 1), is a stable fixed point, and
(b) λc is a value where φk(λ) = ekR˜(λ)x˜− x˜R˜(λ)x˜, for some k 6= i, j, changes sign from
negative to positive,
then x˜ changes its qualitative behaviour at λc and x˜ becomes unstable.
Proof.
According to Bomze’s result on fixed points x˜ = αei + (1− α)ej (Proposition 24 in [15]),
the values
φk(λ) = ekR˜(λ)x˜− x˜R˜(λ)x˜, k 6= i, j,
are the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at x˜.
The stability of the fixed point implies that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian have negative
real parts. Hence, the changes in sign of at least one eigenvalue will lead to the changes
in qualitative behaviour of the fixed point.

We should note that Lemma 3.2.1 can be adapted to the case of the unstable fixed point.
However, for the unstable point to become stable it is required that all non-negative
eigenvalues change their sign to negative.
Next, it is well known [15] that if x˜ is a fixed point of the replicator dynamics, then
(∇gx˜x˜) = −φ(x˜)x˜, (3.5)
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where ∇gx˜ is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point x˜. We use this fact in
order to continue our analysis.
Note that we are using a canonical form of the reward matrix from (3.1). Next, construct
the ith replicator equation in terms of elements of the n×n reward matrix R˜ and a vector
x for k, j = 1, . . . , n:
x˙i = gi(x) = xi
(∑
j 6=i
xj r˜ij −
(∑
j 6=i
xixj(r˜ij + r˜ji) +
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkr˜kl
))
= xi(fi−φ), (3.6)
where the last equality follows from (2.8)–(2.9).
Consider the general case of the i-th component of ∇gx for some vector x:
(∇gx)i =
n∑
j=1
xj
∂gi(x)
∂xj
= xi
(∑
j 6=i
xj r˜ij − 2
∑
j 6=i
xixj(r˜ij + r˜ji)−
∑
k,j 6=i
xkxj(r˜kj + r˜jk)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
xir˜ij − x2i (r˜ij + r˜ji)−
∑
k 6=j,i
xixk(r˜kj + r˜jk)
)
= xi
(
2
∑
j 6=i
xj r˜ij −
(
3
∑
j 6=i
xixj(r˜ij + r˜ji) + 3
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkr˜kl
))
= xi(2fi − 3φ).
(3.7)
Comparing equations (3.6)–(3.7) it follows that
(∇gx)i = 2xi(fi − φ)− xiφ = 2x˙i − xiφ. (3.8)
Hence, if x˜ is a fixed point, then x˙i = 0,∀i, and we obtain (3.5), as required.
Next, let us analyse the behaviour of the incompetent replicator dynamics at the fixed
point x˜ such that
x˙i = x˜i
(
(R˜(λ)x˜)i − x˜T R˜(λ)x˜
)
= 0.
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In the matrix form we obtain
X˜R˜(λ)x˜ = X˜
(
x˜T R˜(λ)x˜
)
= X˜φ(x˜)1 = φ(x˜)x˜,
where X˜ is the diagonal matrix with x˜i on the diagonal. From (3.5) we obtain
X˜R˜(λ)x˜ = −∇gx˜x˜ = φ(x˜)x˜. (3.9)
Further, let us define λc for which bifurcations of the replicator dynamics occur when
the mean fitness of the population x˜ equals zero in the following way.
Definition 3.2.6 Let λc be a balanced bifurcation parameter value of the fixed point x˜
when the mean fitness φ(x˜, λc) = 0.
Even though the case of an interior fixed point may be “rare” from a mathematical stand-
point, many biological systems that are of interest possess such fixed points. Their pres-
ence reflects the desirable condition of coexistence and hence deserves special attention.
We then formulate the next result.
Lemma 3.2.2 If x˜ is an interior fixed point, that is x˜i > 0,∀i, then every balanced
bifurcation parameter value, λc, is also a singular point of Γλ.
Proof.
Because φ(x˜, λc) = 0 and x˜ > 0, equation (3.9) implies that the matrix X˜R˜(λc) is singular
and hence
det
(
X˜R˜(λc)
)
=
(
n∏
i=1
x˜i
)
× det
(
R˜(λc)
)
= 0,
since det(X˜) = (
∏n
i=1 x˜i). But the latter is positive since x˜ > 0, implying det(R˜(λ
c)) = 0.
The result follows from Definition 3.2.5.
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Having a fixed point in the interior of the simplex is a nice property. However, games
might also possess fixed points on the boundaries of the simplex or one might even observe
heteroclinic cycles (e.g. see [53]). However, using a result by Taylor and Jonker, which
says that for the ESS the fitness of extinct strategies is less than the mean fitness of the
ESS [119], we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.1 Let x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n−1, 0) with xj > 0, j = 1, . . . , n − 1, be a fixed
point of the game Γλ. Let λ
c be a balanced bifurcation parameter. Then every balanced
bifurcation parameter value, λc, is either a singular point of Γλ or a singular point of Γ¯λ,
where Γ¯λ is a game with the reward matrix R¯(λ) being R˜(λ) with the last row and the last
column removed.
Proof.
Let us first recall that the matrix R˜(λc) has the following structure
R˜(λc) =

R¯(λc)
r˜1,n
...
r˜n−1,n
r˜n,1 ... r˜n,n 0
 .
From (3.9) we obtain
[R˜(λc)x˜]i =
 0, ∀i 6= nfn, i = n.
If det
(
R˜(λc)
)
= 0, then λc is a singular point of R˜(λc). Otherwise, R˜(λc)−1 exists and
hence fn 6= 0. Then
R˜(λc)x˜ = fnen
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and
x˜ = fnR˜
−1(λc)en.
Then, by Cramer’s rule,
x˜j =
det(R˜j(λ
c))
det(R˜(λc))
,
where R˜j(λ
c) is the same as R˜(λc) except that jth column is fnen.
As x˜n = 0 we obtain det
(
R˜n(λ
c)
)
= (−1)2nfn det
(
R˜nn(λ
c)
)
= 0, where R˜nn(λ
c) = R¯(λc)
is a corresponding cofactor. Then,
det
(
R¯(λc)
)
= det
(
R˜nn(λ
c)
)
= 0. (3.10)

So far, we considered the specially structured cases with an interior equilibrium, with
one strategy becoming extinct and with only one or two strategies surviving. In these
cases, our results give an easy way to verify if there exists a crucial transition point on the
adaptation trajectory for games with ESS, especially for low-dimensional systems, that
is, n ≤ 3. In order to continue our analysis, we recall a definition from [129].
Definition 3.2.7 A property of the dynamic system is called robust if it is preserved
under small perturbations.
Once we know the nature of bifurcation points, we observe that the number of transitions
induced by the bifurcations in the game is finite. Let us define a value λu ∈ (0, 1) after
which no transition is possible.
Definition 3.2.8 Let λu be such that λu = maxλc. Then λu is the maximal critical value
of the incompetence parameter for a fixed point x˜.
38
Next, we want to consider the limiting behaviour of the ESS with sufficiently small per-
turbations under incompetence.
Definition 3.2.9 Let D(λ) := Q(λ) − I be the perturbation (from full competence) due
to incompetence. We shall call ||D(λ)|| the size of such a perturbation. If the game Γλ is
such that for all λ ≥ λu we obtain ||D(λ)|| < δ(λu), then we shall say that such a δ-small
perturbation under incompetence is called a sufficiently small perturbation for the fixed
point x˜.
In other words, if we know that there exists λu ∈ [0, 1] sufficiently close to 1, then in the
interval (λu, 1] no bifurcations of the fixed point occur and the game preserves its robust
properties. Hence, if the population is familiar enough with the environment, species
are more likely to behave as in the original game, and the game tends to preserve the
same behavioural habits as the original one. Arguably, this is the situation of “sufficient
competence”. Furthermore, we can formulate the next result.
Theorem 3.2.3 If the game Γ1 possesses an ESS, x˜, and ||Q(λ)− I|| ≤ δ(λu), then the
incompetent game Γλ, when λ ∈ (λu, 1], possesses an ESS, x˜(λ), and
lim
λ→1−
x˜(λ) = x˜. (3.11)
Proof.
We know that the evolutionary stability of the game implies local stability and resistance
to small perturbations [15, 61, 62].
The fixed point x˜(λ) does not experience any bifurcations when λ > λu. Next, we know
that all real parts of eigenvalues of the Jacobian at this point preserve their sign. At λ = 1
we obtain x˜(λ) = x˜, that is, all eigenvalues of x˜ have negative real parts, hence we obtain
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that all eigenvalues of x˜(λ) have negative real parts. This implies that x˜(λ) is hyperbolic,
and, hence, the incompetent replicator dynamics is locally structurally stable.
From the previous statement we conclude that the initial replicator dynamics and incom-
petent replicator dynamics for λ > λu are locally topologically equivalent as perturbations
under incompetence are smooth and points are both hyperbolic. Then x˜(λ) is an ESS
for R˜(λ) and hence by Theorem 2.2.3 for every  > 0 there exists λ ∈ (λu, 1] such that
∀λ > λ
||x˜(λ)− x˜|| < , ∀ > 0.

We should note that all results obtained in this section describe the evolution of the
strategy choice. However, according to the incompetence matrix Q(λ) for any given λ
and strategy choice, x˜(λ), we observe a stochastic behaviour of the species, y˜(λ), affected
by their incompetence as a result of
y˜(λ) = Q(λ)x˜(λ). (3.12)
Thus, effectively, the executed strategy y˜(λ) is a lottery on the entries of x˜(λ) due to the
species’ incompetence. Besides the incompetence parameter λ we can treat the matrix
of the starting level of incompetence S as another important input that may change
the dynamics of the game. Depending on the choice of this matrix, we may observe
different behaviour of the replicator dynamics. The interesting point here is that starting
probabilities can be considered as a learning advantage. That is, if the starting probability
of acting without mistakes for one strategy is higher than for others, this strategy may
become advantageous in the game with incompetence. However, this also depends on
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other factors, such as the fitness advantage.
Also, according to the Definition 3.2.9 and Theorem 3.2.3, if the starting level of incompe-
tence is initially close enough to the identity matrix, then fixed points do not experience
bifurcations. For example, due to the highly robust dynamical behaviour it can be easily
shown that in 2-dimensional games, existence of bifurcations requires the diagonal ele-
ments of the matrix S to be less than 0.5. This was evident from the example discussed in
detail in Section 3.1. However, this condition is not required for higher-order dimensional
games; see the example in Section 3.3.
Furthermore, in Lemma 3.2.2 we showed that critical values of λ can be determined by
analysing the determinant of the incompetent reward matrix R˜(λ). We shall use a result
on the determinant of a matrix and its rank-one transformation.
Theorem 3.2.4 [50] If R is an invertible n×n matrix, and u and v are two n-dimensional
column vectors, then
det
(
R + uvT
)
=
(
1 + vTR−1u
)
det(R).
Then, according to (3.1), the determinant of the reward matrix can be analysed under a
rank-one transformation. That is, it can be written as:
det
(
R˜(λ)
)
= det
(
R(λ)− dR(λ)1T
)
=
(
1− 1TR(λ)−1dR(λ)
)
det (R(λ))
=
(
1− 1TR(λ)−1dR(λ)
)
det(R) [det(Q(λ))]2 , (3.13)
where the last equality follows from (2.4).
Hence, singular points of the incompetent game might be caused by zeroing either det (Q(λ))
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or
[
1− 1TR(λ)−1dR(λ)
]
. That is, if the starting level of incompetence S is such that
det (Q(λ)) changes its sign while λ grows from 0 to 1 at least once, then singular points
occur. Hence, it is possible that the further S is from the identity matrix, the higher the
impact of learning.
3.3 Three strategies: Hawks, Doves and Retaliators
(HDR)
Let us next demonstrate our results on the 3-dimensional extension of the Hawk-Dove
game. Imagine that we add a new type of the species called “Retaliators” to the system.
A Retaliator behaves as a Hawk against Hawks, as a Dove against Doves, and never
escalates first. As in Section 3.1, species share the same amount of resources b > 0 and
when escalating they have a 50% chance of being injured. The payoff matrix then looks
as follows:
R =
Hawk Dove Retaliator

Hawk b−c
2
b b−c
2
Dove 0 b
2
b
2
Retaliator b−c
2
b
2
b
2
.
For instance, when b = 2 and c = 4:
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R =
Hawk Dove Retaliator

Hawk −1 2 −1
Dove 0 1 1
Retaliator −1 1 1
.
This example was analysed by Bomze [14] and the flow associated with the replicator
equations for this game is shown in Figure 3.1. Vertices of the triangle correspond to
populations consisting of only Hawks, Doves or Retaliators. There are two isolated fixed
points and one pointwise-fixed line. The latter corresponds to Doves and Retaliators
coexisting, at equilibrium, in all possible proportions. A pure strategy Hawk, represented
by the point [1, 0, 0], is a source. Any population with initial frequency of Doves or
Retaliators greater than 0 will evolve away from this point. A mixed strategy of Hawks
and Doves, represented by [1
2
, 1
2
, 0], is a sink. Hence, any population with an appropriately
small portion of Retaliators will tend to this equilibrium. However, if the number of
Retaliators is sufficiently large, the mixture of Retaliators and Doves becomes evolutionary
desirable and outcompetes the aggressive Hawks. This is a consequence of the high injury
cost c = 4.
This game is a non-robust version of the HDR-game and any small perturbations of the
entries of R might change the behavior of the dynamics. We introduce incompetence in
this case, with the starting level S that allows different learning advantages for Hawks
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Figure 3.1: The flow of the HDR-game. Here, the unstable point is captured as an
empty circle and the stable point is captured as a filled circle. We use the Wolfram
MATHEMATICA project [63] to produce phase planes for this manuscript.
and Retaliators, but no advantage for Doves:
S =

1
2
1
2
0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
4
1
2
1
4

.
Assume F = I in (2.5). Then the incompetence matrix for this example is
Q(λ) =

1
2
+ 1
2
λ 1
2
− 1
2
λ 0
1
3
− 1
3
λ 1
3
+ 2
3
λ 1
3
− 1
3
λ
1
4
− 1
4
λ 1
2
− 1
2
λ 1
4
+ 3
4
λ

. (3.14)
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Now it is easy to derive R˜(λ) from (3.1) as
R˜(λ) =

0 3
2
λ2 − 1
2
λ −3
2
λ2 − 1
2
λ
λ2 + 1
6
λ− 1
6
0 −1
8
λ2 + 1
6
λ− 1
24
3
8
λ2 − 1
4
λ− 1
8
1
2
λ2 − 7
12
λ+ 1
12
0

.
Depending on the value of the incompetence parameter, λ, we obtain different qualitative
behaviour of the game dynamics. In particular, the set of critical points is Λ = {0, 1
7
, 1
3
, 1}.
These four critical values λc, and the three intervals of [0, 1] induced by them, determine
seven regions with different qualitative behaviour. Note that four of these regions are
merely the four critical values of λ, while the remaining three are the in-between intervals.
The game flows for these regions are in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1 (for λ = 1). It is easy
to verify that det
(
R˜(λc)
)
= 0 for each λc ∈ Λ. Indeed, in this example Λ = Z (see
Definition 3.2.4).
Let us analyse changes in stability properties of the fixed points depending on the incom-
petence parameter. For sufficiently low levels of competence we see that a Hawk strategy
is preferable, especially for λ ∈ [0, 1
7
]. However, as species adapt to the environment and
improve their competence, we observe that Retaliator and Dove strategies are compet-
ing with the aggressive Hawk behaviour. That is, for the low competence, aggressive
behaviour is more preferable by natural selection. However, by adapting and improving
their competence, species are more likely to choose less harmful strategies. In the region
λ ∈ (1
3
, 1) we obtain a stabilised version of HDR-game. Here Doves outcompete Retalia-
tors: despite the fact that the Dove vertex is a saddle point (see Panel (f) in Figure 3.2),
when Retaliators are established they outcompete Hawks, and then Doves outcompete
Retaliators. At λ = 1 we observe an unstable game flow from Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.2: The flow for the HDR-game for: (a) λ = 0, (b) λ = 3
25
∈ (0, 1
7
), (c) λ = 1
7
, (d)
λ = 1
4
∈ (1
7
, 1
3
), (e) λ = 1
3
, (f) λ = 3
5
∈ (1
3
, 1).
Let us now determine the existence of the ESS in this example. For the interval λ ∈ [0, 1
3
)
a Hawk is the most preferable strategy. Furthermore, it is an ESS. As λ approaches 1
3
,
the Hawk’s competitive advantage weakens, and when it becomes a source after λ = 1
3
(see Panel (e) and (f) in Figure 3.2), any trajectory runs away from this point. For λ > 1
3
the probabilities of other incidental strategies tend to 0, and a new ESS on the edge
corresponding to Hawk-Dove starts to gain power.
However, as previously mentioned, the evolution of fixed points depending on the incom-
petence parameter established above is a description of the evolution of a strategy choice.
Of course, in nature, it is only possible to observe y˜(λ) (see (3.12)). Namely, the current
fixed point x˜(λ), which depends on the current level of incompetence and is randomised
by the effect of the incompetence matrix Q(λ). That is, according to (3.14) for small λ
at the pure-Hawk-population ESS, we may still observe Dove behaviour with probability
[Q(λ)]12 =
1
2
− 1
2
λ. The probability of observing Retaliators is non-zero for larger λ at
the ESS on the Hawk-Dove edge (see left panel on Figure 3.3), where x˜1(λ), x˜2(λ), x˜3(λ)
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correspond to the red, blue and green curves, respectively. The plot of the corresponding
y˜1(λ), y˜2(λ), y˜3(λ) probabilities can be found in Figure 3.3 (right panel), with the same
colour scheme.
Figure 3.3: The frequencies of HDR strategies at the Hawk-Dove edge fixed point (left
panel) and probabilities of meeting HDR strategies at this point (right panel) depending
on λ.
3.4 Conclusions
When populations are unfamiliar with a new environment, it is a natural assumption that
individuals may be prone to behavioural errors. Indeed, this has been observed within a
diverse range of systems, from bacteria utilising motility genes [2] to language learning
for human beings [68, 69]. In this chapter we proposed a generalized theoretical approach
to this concept by incorporating a notion of incompetence into the central concept of
evolutionary game theory: the replicator dynamics.
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Under incompetence, by analysing replicator dynamics, we are analysing the strategy
choice. Selection may be different to what occurs in the fully competent case. Moreover,
the special structure of perturbations under incompetence contains hints as to where to
look for qualitative changes in evolutionary dynamics. If dynamics are structurally stable,
then incompetence must be high to affect the evolutionary stable outcome of the dynamics.
However, structural stability is an elegant but rare condition for high-dimensional systems
[62]. Hence, even small perturbations of the payoff matrix, corresponding to a small degree
of incompetence, may affect the selection outcome in natural systems. Additionally, in
nature, we cannot query species about their strategy choice. All we can do is to observe
their strategy execution and, according to the incompetence matrix, whenever λ < 1 we
encounter stochasticity in the population behaviour. Thus, if some behavioural types
become extinct, they may still appear within the population as a manifestation of their
mistakes. This may act as a redundancy, allowing species to utilise “lost” strategies if they
become advantageous again, perhaps, due to changes in environmental conditions. This
implies that a “memory” of extinct types may persist and lead to re-emergence of these
types. On the other hand, if species begin with learning advantages or disadvantages, this
may also affect the outcome of the selection process under incompetence. For example,
if there are two available strategies equivalent in fitness measure, we expect that the one
that is easier to learn will dominate. It would be fascinating to design experiments with
suitable organisms, such as bacterial populations [37, 74, 75, 76], to test whether this
phenomenon can be observed under laboratory conditions.
Here, we made the first step in the direction of understanding evolutionary games under
incompetence. We considered only a one-parameter system with one population of inter-
acting species. It will be natural to extend this to n-parametrised systems, where each
strategy choice i has its own adaptation parameter λi. That is, for the set of n strategies,
we could consider an incompetence vector λ = (λ1, ..., λn), where λi is the adaptation
parameter for ith behavioural type. Future work could also examine interactions between
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several populations, or applications of this theoretical approach within real-world systems.
However, in the next chapter we focus on the case when incompetence parameter depends
on time, which implies that species are able to improve their strategy execution. We shall
consider several forms of learning functions and analyse their effect on the evolutionary
dynamics.
49
Publications included in Chapter 4
The next chapter is based on the submitted paper:
Kleshnina M., Filar J.A. and Gonza´lez-Tokman C. Nonlinear learning and learning
advantages in evolutionary games. Submitted, 2018.
Authors have contributed as follows:
Contributor Statement of contribution
Author: M. Kleshnina (Candidate) 1) conception and design of the project;
2) analysis and interpretation of the research;
3) drafting significant parts of the publication.
Author: J.A. Filar 1) conception and design of the project;
2) analysis and interpretation of the research;
3) editing significant parts of the publication.
Author: C. Gonza´lez-Tokman 1) analysis and interpretation of the research;
2) editing significant parts of the publication.
Column two of the above table lists the components of the research to which the named
co-author has significantly contributed.
MK and CGT, with JAF’s help, designed the project. MK performed the analysis and
interpretation of the results, and composed the initial draft of the manuscript. JAF
and CGT contributed to the analysis and various proofs, and critically reviewed the
publication. JAF edited multiple versions of the manuscript.
50
Chapter 4
Nonlinear learning in evolutionary
games under incompetence
4.1 Evolutionary dynamics with nonlinear learning
In the previous chapter the degree of incompetence was captured by a parameter λ that
varies from 0 to 1. Equivalently, λ reflects the level of “competence” of species. That
is, the better the animals are in their strategy execution, the closer this parameter is to
1. Now we define λ(t) as a function of time and study its impact on game dynamics
depending on the functional form of the adaptation.
The adaptation processes of different live organisms have been widely studied in different
fields [56, 81, 105]. Lenski et al. ran an experiment on the adaptation processes in Es-
cherichia coli [7, 74, 76] and showed that after a population of bacteria was placed in a new
environment, it evolved from low relative fitness to an adaptive peak or a plateau. Hence,
the adaptation trajectory λ(t) can be assigned to the entire population when the environ-
ment is static. However, in nature, environments are changing due to different reasons
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such as seasonal fluctuations, climate changes, catastrophes or anthropogenic impacts.
Whereas unforeseen events are usually modelled as some form of a stochastic process,
seasonal fluctuations were modelled in [11] via evolutionary game theory approach. In
this chapter we address two different adaptation trajectories and examine their influence
on the evolutionary impact with the aim of finding the adequate adaptation level to the
fluctuating environment. Further, we introduce a new concept of learning advantages
where the randomisation of behavioural reactions might become crucial for surviving.
Hence, we shall say that flexibility in reactions to the environmental changes is an impor-
tant skill for animals living in fluctuating environments.
From now on we assume that species are able to learn and adapt to the changing environ-
ment over time. The population under consideration will explore their environment via
a learning process with an incompetence function λ(τ). That is, we let them adapt from
some starting level of incompetence to the level of perfect competence by the nonlinear
adaptation law given by
Q (λ(τ)) = (1− λ(τ))S + λ(τ)I, λ(τ) ∈ [0, 1], (4.1)
where S is the starting level of incompetence as before and τ is the learning time. This
is a generalisation of (2.5) since the learning parameter is now a function of time.
Hence, in the evolutionary sense, behavioural mistakes lead to the perturbations in the
fitness that the population obtains over time. This might be the case for the population
migrating to the new unexplored environment or with the changing environment. In other
words, when species have to adapt to new conditions. In the same manner as in Chapter
1, this process is immersed in the population dynamics: the fitness of ith strategy at time
τ is now given by
fi(λ(τ)) =
n∑
j=1
rij(λ(τ))xj = e
T
i R(λ(τ))x,
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where R(λ(τ)) denotes an incompetent fitness matrix (2.4) with a time-varying incom-
petent matrix (4.1), and the mean fitness of the entire population is defined as follows:
φ(λ(τ)) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(λ(τ)) = x
TR(λ(τ))x. (4.2)
Based on these changes to the fitnesses we are now working with the incompetent repli-
cator dynamics
x˙i = xi (fi(λ(τ))− φ(λ(τ))) , i = 1, ..., n,
or in a matrix form
x˙i = xi
(
(R(λ(τ))x)i − xTR(λ(τ))x
)
, i = 1, ..., n. (4.3)
That is, we explore the non-autonomous n-dimensional system (4.3). An important fea-
ture of such systems is that the time scale of replicator dynamics for x(t) might not
coincide with the time scale of adaptation for λ(τ). This means that individuals may
explore their environment much faster or much slower than they reproduce, depending on
the environment and a particular species. We study this phenomenon in Section 4.2 when
assuming a sigmoid learning process for individuals. In Section 4.3, we also examine the
periodic environmental fluctuations caused by seasonal changes immersed in the evolu-
tionary game via periodic forcing affecting the selection. In Section 4.4 we introduce and
explore a new concept of learning advantages and study how that may affect adaptability
of populations.
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4.2 Individual nonlinear learning
From Chapter 2, we know that in the linear case, when λ is treated as a fixed parameter,
we observe bifurcations in the replicator dynamics that also depend on the starting level
of incompetence S. In this section we will explore what happens with the population
dynamics when the process of learning is treated as a function of time. There are many
options for choosing the form of time dependence. However, we explore a sigmoid learning
that has broad applicability. This functional form is a reasonable choice for modelling in-
dividuals’ learning process. For example, in bacterial adaptation to the new environment,
the fitness of bacteria was slowly developing in the beginning, then rapidly growing, and
finally slowing down after some time [75]. This functional form also reflects the widely ap-
plied logistic growth of the population [41]. Mathematically, this function can be written
as
λ(τ) =
1
1 + e−a(τ−b)
,
where parameters a and b depend on the given conditions of the learning process. These
parameters determine how fast and steep is the learning process of species. We assume
that the learning time scale τ is different from the reproduction time t as species may
reproduce with a different pace from the one with which they are exploring their environ-
ment. Let us assume that the learning time τ is scaled to the time of reproduction with
some positive constant α, that is, τ = αt. Then, we can rewrite the adaptation function
as a function of time t ∈ [0,∞)
λ(t) =
1
1 + e−a(αt−b)
. (4.4)
The adaptation process described in (4.1) with a fixed parameter λ causes bifurcations in
replicator dynamics and, hence, changes the outcome of the game. However, in the case
with the incompetence parameter being a function of time, we induce a new evolution
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process that depends on parameters a, b, α from (4.4). That is, the convergence to the
expected outcome might be extended in time depending on the learning process. We will
demonstrate this with the following example.
Consider a two-dimensional classical Hawk-Dove game with the fitness matrix:
Hawk Dove

Hawk −1 2
Dove 0 1
.
This game has an ESS x˜ = (1
2
, 1
2
) [110]. Let us introduce incompetence in this game with
the starting level of incompetence given by:
S =

0.3 0.7
0.6 0.4
 .
Let us also introduce a learning process (4.1) with the incompetence function from (4.4).
Dynamical behaviour of the solution x(t) depending on parameters a, b, α is captured on
Figure 4.1–4.3. Here we see that an incompetent population tends to behave differently
from the fully competent case.
We observe that the impact of the learning process is higher when the population has just
started to explore their environment, which corresponds to a low λ in Figures 4.1–4.3.
That is, bifurcations cause the dominance of the strategy that was unfavourable in the
fully competent case. In Section 3.1 it was shown that for a Hawk-Dove game, it is a
Hawk strategy that dominates in the case of low competence, which is reflected in the
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Figure 4.1: Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.001, b =
5, 000, α = 10. For these values of the parameters we see that Hawk’s strategy represented
as a red line is more frequent for low competence of species. Once λ(t) reaches its half-
saturation rate (around t = 500) we observe that stable coexistence of Hawks and Doves
emerges.
figures here as a high frequency of Hawks. If the time scale of learning is large enough (see
Figures 4.1 and 4.2), this may lead to the situation where this strategy has an opportunity
to outcompete a Dove strategy. But according to (2.2), the execution of this strategy will
still be perturbed and another strategy will reappear in the population in the form of
mistakes. Hence, this may become a tool for surviving.
However, mathematically speaking, changes in dynamical behaviour caused by the changes
in the parameter λ as time varies are called time-dependent bifurcations. In such a case,
besides the bifurcation values of the parameter, it is becoming important to identify the
time when the parameter hits those values. In other words, we are interested in computing
the critical time when bifurcations happen.
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Figure 4.2: Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.001, b =
10, 000, α = 10. Here the stable coexistence emerges much later as λ(t)→ 1 much slower,
compared to Figure 4.1.
In our settings, the time scale of learning, α, can be considered as a selection pressure
or, even more, the measure of evolutionary success or simply a measure of fitness. By
saying this, we mean that the faster species learn and adapt, the better their chance
to reproduce and survive. Specifically, it is the case for the games with an ESS when
reaching an evolutionary stable state becomes a guarantee of survival. For example, with
regard to bacteria, we say that E.coli live in almost static environments and would have
a very small learning time-scaling constant α [75]. At the same time, marine bacteria
might be required to adapt much faster due to the turbulence which causes changes in
the environment [115].
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Figure 4.3: Population dynamics of the Hawk-Dove game for λ(t) with a = 0.005, b =
2, 500, α = 10. Here the stable coexistence emerges much earlier as λ(t)→ 1 much faster,
compared to Figure 4.1, and at t = 300 populations of Hawks and Doves stably coexist.
4.2.1 Time-dependent bifurcations and critical times
For now we assume the form of the function λ(t) from (4.4). Let us recall that, from
Definition 3.2.9, there exists a maximal critical value of λ. Namely, for any λ > λu the
dynamics of Γλ remain qualitatively similar to the Γ1 game. Let us assume that the
system Γλ has a stable equilibrium x˜(λ) for any λ ∈ [λu, 1] with a fixed point x˜(λ). That
situation was studied in Section 3.2. From (4.4) we can identify the time tu such that
λ(tu) = λu. Let us define the asymptotic stability of the fixed point.
Definition 4.2.1 Assume λ ∈ [λu, 1]. An equilibrium x˜(λ) of Γλ is called asymptotically
stable if for any  there exists δ() > 0, t ≥ tu such that the solution x(t) of Γλ(t) with
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x(0) = x0 satisfies
||x(t)− x˜(λ)|| < , ∀t ∈ (t,∞),
when ||x0 − x˜(λ)|| < δ().
Let us also recall Theorem 3.2.3 which states that existence of an ESS in the original
game implies existence of the ESS in the incompetent game after some λu. In addition,
we require the next lemma, which is based on the proof of Theorem 1 in [129].
Lemma 4.2.1 Let x˜ be an ESS of the fully competent game Γ1. Then the function V (x) =∏n
i=1 x
x˜i
i is a strict local Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics with the derivative
along the trajectories being V˙ (x) = V (x) (x˜Rx− xRx) > 0,∀x 6= x˜, x in a neighbourhood
N of x˜.
Now the following result can be established.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let x˜ := x˜(1) be an ESS for Γ1. Now consider the λ(t)-varying game
Γλ(t), where λ(t) is the sigmoid adaptation function (4.4). Let λ
u > λc for all bifurcation
points λc of the λ-fixed games Γλ and t
u > 0 be the time when λ(tu) = λu. Then there
exists t > tu such that x˜ is an ESS for Γλ(t) on the interval (t,∞).
Proof.
An ESS is an asymptotically stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics [15]. From (4.1)
we have
Q(λ(t)) = (1− λ(t))S + λ(t)I,
which from (2.4) yields
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R(λ(t)) = [(1− λ(t))S + λ(t)I]R [(1− λ(t))S + λ(t)I]T (4.5)
= λ(t)2R + λ(t)(1− λ(t)) [SR +RST ]+ (1− λ(t))2SRST .
Substituting (4.5) into (4.3) we obtain
g(x, t) = λ(t)2X
(
Rx− xTRx1)+ (1− λ(t))2X (SRSTx− xTSRSTx1)+
λ(t)(1− λ(t))X ([SR +RST ]x− xT [SR +RST ]x1) . (4.6)
Hence,
g(x, t) = λ(t)2g(x) + λ(t)(1− λ(t))gSST (x, t) + (1− λ(t))2gS(x, t), (4.7)
with gSS
T
(x, t) = X
([
SR +RST
]
x− xT [SR +RST ]x1) and
gS(x, t) = X
(
SRSTx− xTSRSTx1).
According to Lemma 4.2.1, we consider the function V (x) =
∏n
i=1 x
x˜i
i as a candidate for
the strict local Lyapunov function of the equation (4.7). Then we have
Vi :=
∂V (x)
∂xi
= V (x(λ(t)))
x˜i(λ(t))
xi
,
and hence
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V˙ (x, t) =
n∑
i=1
Vix˙i(λ(t)) = V (x(λ(t)))
n∑
i=1
x˜i(λ(t))
xi
xi (R(λ(t))x− xR(λ(t))x) .
Then, substituting R(λ(t)) from (4.5) into V˙ (x, t) we obtain
V˙ (x, t) =λ(t)2V (x) (x˜Rx− xRx) + (1− λ(t))2(V (x) (x˜SRSTx− xSRSTx)
+ λ(t)(1− λ(t))V (x) (x˜ [SR +RST ]x− x [SR +RST ]x))
= λ(t)2V˙ (x) + h(x, λ(t)).
Then, as λ(t) → 1, h(x, λ(t)) → 0 and for a every  > 0 there exists t > tu such that
∀t > t
||V˙ (x, t)− V˙ (x)|| < ,
provided that x is in the attraction region N of x˜. In order to show that x˜ is an ESS of
Γλ(t) on (t,∞), it is sufficient to show that for every x ∈ N and t > t either V˙ (x, t) > 0 or
|x− x˜| < δ() for some δ() such that lim→0 δ() = 0. As V (x) is a strict local Lyapunov
function, then V (x) > 0. Next, let us consider the function x˜Rx − xRx, which is equal
to 0 only at x˜ and is positive for any other x by the definition of an ESS. Then, for
every  > 0 sufficiently small there exists δ = δ() such that the pre-image of [0, ) under
V˙ (x) = V (x)(x˜Rx − xRx) satisfies V˙ −1([0, )) ∩ N ⊂ Bδ(x˜) and lim→0 δ() = 0, where
Bδ(x˜) is a ball of radius δ centred at x˜. This completes the proof.

Let us now define the critical time of the learning adaptation process as the first time
when the incompetence function, λ(t), attains the maximal critical value, λu, of Theorems
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3.2.3 and 4.2.2. We shall say that the species is in an evolutionarily weak phase prior to
tu because it is susceptible to invasions that may prevent it from reaching the ESS, x˜.
Corollary 4.2.2.1 Let λu be the maximal bifurcation value of the incompetence parameter
for x˜, then the critical time is given by
tu =
1
α
(
b− 1
a
ln
(
1− λu
λu
))
. (4.8)
Proof.
The proof of this corollary follows directly from the functional form of λ(t) given by (4.2).
Namely, we solve for tu the equation
λu =
1
1 + e−a(αtu−b)
,
and hence
λu − 1
λu
= e−a(αt
u−b).

Individual learning describes the adaptation process of the entire population to the new
environment. This functional form of λ(t) can be applied to the analysis when species
are immersed in a new environment due to a migration process or some unitary change.
By analysing parameters of λ(t) we can say how long will it take for species to be fully
recovered in a behavioural sense and act as in an environment they are familiar with.
However, while the functional form of the adaptation trajectory captures the pace and
steepness of the learning process, the starting level of incompetence measures how dra-
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matic the changes in the environment are. That is, the more different the new habitat is
from the previous one, the longer it may take for organisms to fully recover.
The individual learning covered in this section describes adaptation to a once-off change
in a species’ habitat. However, natural environments are prone to some stochasticity
or seasonal fluctuations [11, 39, 40, 117]. In order to model this, we may use periodic
functions for the learning process of organisms.
4.3 Environmental fluctuations: periodic forcing
A changing environment was modelled with the help of evolutionary game theory as
a stochastic process [34]. However, stochasticity is not the only factor characterising
environmental changes. Seasonal fluctuations in temperature, humidity, food availability
all tend to cause periodic environmental changes. Depending on regional factors, these
fluctuations may range from almost unnoticeable to extreme. Hence, different habitats
may require different adaptation skills from living organisms [39, 40].
Mathematically, that means that the incompetence parameter need not rise from 0 towards
1 just once when the environment has changed permanently. Instead, in synchrony with
the aim of capturing seasonal fluctuations, the adaptation function is now endowed with
the shape of a periodic function. Mathematically, we propose the functional form
λ(t) =
1
2
sin(αt) +
1
2
, t ∈ (0,∞), (4.9)
where α is interpreted as a frequency of fluctuations in environmental conditions. For
instance, small α reflects a longer period after which the learning cycle repeats itself.
For example, see Figure 4.4. While we only consider the sine function, this functional
form could have a more complicated shape, reflecting different degrees of changes between
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seasons.
Figure 4.4: The learning function λ(t) for α = 0.05 and a period of approximately 125
days. This learning process may represent adaptation of species to periodic fluctuations,
e.g. seasonal environmental changes.
Let us now demonstrate how periodic forcing changes the selection process on the classical
example of the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game. This game was analysed in Section 3.3 with
a fixed parameter λ and it was shown that incompetence causes bifurcations of the game’s
fixed points.
Figure 4.5: Game flow (a) and population dynamics (b) for Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game.
The game has an ESS which is a fair mixture of Hawks and Doves. There is also a point-
wise fixed line where any mixture between Retaliators and Doves is stable and desirable.
However, this line is not robust and does not persist ant small perturbations.
Population dynamics of the original fully competent game are captured in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.6: Population dynamics for the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game for three different
starting levels of incompetence corresponding to one periodic adaptation trajectory λ(t):
(a) the starting level of incompetence S1 with fully mixed executions; (b) the starting
level of incompetence S2 with strictly structured executions where Hawks and Doves
interchange their behaviour and Retaliators obtain a completely mixed probability vector;
(c) the starting level of incompetence S3 where S3 is sufficiently close to the identity
matrix.
We know that the original Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game possesses an ESS which is a fair
mixture of Hawks and Doves. In the case of a fixed parameter λ we obtained different
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game flows following from the values of that parameter (see Figure 3.2). The game Γλ
also depends on the structure of the starting level of the incompetence matrix, S.
Dynamics of the incompetent game that use (4.2) are depicted in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6
(a)–(b) demonstrate two population trajectories that correspond to two different S matri-
ces S1 and S2, respectively. The first matrix reflects greater mixing of the behaviours for
all three strategies, whereas the second matrix reflects mixing only for Retaliators, while
Hawks and Doves just interchange their behaviour. The first matrix, S1, induces periodic
behaviour of the solution whereas the second matrix, S2, does not cause any change in
the population dynamics (compare panels (a) and (b) on Figure 4.6 correspondingly).
Note that, in view of (4.9) and (4.1)
Q(λ(t)) = S, when t =
(
3 + 4k
α
)
pi
2
, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Thus the learning time-scale period is 2pi
α
. Hence, in the case with periodic forcing the
impact of S becomes even more significant. Here, the starting level of incompetence may
represent variations in the environmental changes.
We see that existence of critical values of the incompetence parameter is influenced by
both the starting level of incompetence, S, and the fitness matrix, R. In addition, for
sufficiently small perturbations, that is, when S is sufficiently close to the identity matrix,
we may observe periodic behaviour in the dynamics of games with an ESS. This supports
observations on periodicity of the behavioural patterns among species living in fluctuating
environments. We shall see that when the starting level of incompetence is sufficiently
close to full competence, then the periodic solutions remain close to the solutions of the
fully competent dynamics (see Theorem 4.3.2 below).
Below, we use a result from [46] which states that a hyperbolic equilibrium solution
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of an autonomous differential equation persists as a periodic cycle under small periodic
perturbations of the parameter. In a strict sense this statement is formulated as follows,
with subscripts x and t denoting partial derivatives with respect to these arguments.
Theorem 4.3.1 [46] Let x˙ = G(x) be an autonomous differential equation, with G(x˜) =
0, G′(x˜) 6= 0, and x1(t) = x˜ the resulting equilibrium solution. Consider x˙ = G(x, t) where
G(x, t) is periodic in t with period T . If for all (x, t), |G(x, t)−G(x)|, |Gx(x, t)−G′(x)|, and
|Gt(x, t)| are sufficiently small, then there is a periodic solution x2(t) of the time-dependent
equation that stays arbitrarily close to the solution of the autonomous equation.
Now, using Theorem 4.3.1 and the fact that g(x, λ(t)) in (4.4) is periodic, the following
result can be formulated.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let x˜ be an ESS of Γ1 and x1(t) be a resulting solution for some x1(0) =
x0. For λ(t) being a periodic function of period T =
2pi
α
from (4.9) and a sufficiently small
δ such that ||S− I|| < δ there exists a periodic solution x2(t) with x2(0) = x0 of Γλ(t) that
stays arbitrarily close to x1(t).
Proof.
In order to apply Theorem 4.3.1 we need to estimate |g(x, t) − g(x)|, |gx(x, t) − g′(x)|,
and |gt(x, t)|, and show that they are sufficiently small. The first distance |g(x, t)−g(x)|
is sufficiently small due to the Lipschitz continuity of the replicator dynamics (see p. 141
[123]), that is,
|g(x, t)− g(x)| = |g(x, λ(t))− g(x, 1)| ≤M |λ(t)− 1|,
where M is a Lipschitz constant and λ(t)→ 1 as t→∞.
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Next, we can rewrite the requirement ||S−I|| < δ as S = I+E(δ), where E(δ) is a matrix
with entries ij(δ) that are sufficiently small. For the simplicity of notation we omit the
dependence on δ and simply use E . From (4.1) we have
Q(λ(t)) = (1− λ(t))(I + E) + λ(t)I = I + (1− λ(t))E ,
which from (2.4) yields
R(λ(t)) = [I + (1− λ(t))E ]R [I + (1− λ(t))E ]T (4.10)
= R + (1− λ(t)) [ER +RET ]+ (1− λ(t))2ERET .
Substituting (4.10) into (4.3) and setting X to be a diagonal matrix with entries of the
vector x on the diagonal, we obtain
g(x, t) = X
(
Rx− xTRx1)+ (1− λ(t))X ([ER +RET ]x− xT [ER +RET ]x1)+
(1− λ(t))2X (ERETx− xTERETx1) = g(x) + g(x, λ(t)),
where
g(x, λ(t)) = (1− λ(t))2X (ERETx− xTERETx1)
+(1− λ(t))X ([ER +RET ]x− xT [ER +RET ]x1) .
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Hence,
|gx(x, t)− g′(x)| = |gx(x, λ(t))|,
and for any E with |ij|  1 there exists σ such that |gx(x, t)− g′(x)| < σ.
Next, note that
gt(x, t) = λ˙(t)
∂g(x, λ(t))
∂λ
=
1
2
α cos(αt)
∂g(x, λ(t))
∂λ
,
where
∂g(x, λ(t))
∂λ
= −(2(1− λ(t))X (ERETx− xTERETx1)−
X
([ER +RET ]x− xT [ER +RET ]x1) .
Hence, the derivative gx(x, t) of the periodic replicator dynamics is also sufficiently small.
The result now follows by Theorem 4.3.1.

We have demonstrated that periodic environmental fluctuations may lead to the period-
icity in the population dynamics (see Figure 4.6 (c) for the demonstration of Theorem
4.3.2). This idea was captured by the well-known Lotka-Volterra equations and many
other ecological models [8].
We explain the periodicity in species’ behaviour from the game-theoretic point of view
when a changing environment requires different levels of adaptation and flexibility from
species that need to adapt. Consequently, the ability to react to the fluctuations becomes
crucial.
In view of the above, the concept of learning advantages arises in population dynamics
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analysis. The ability to randomise behaviour as a reaction to environmental changes may
become crucial for a species’ survival. In other words, it may not be that important how
species adapt, but the ability to be flexible may be crucial. The requirement to be flexible
seems to be natural when we model environments that are prone to regular changes.
4.4 Learning advantages
While it may appear counterintuitive at first, we shall say that strategies that are prone to
mistakes have a learning advantage. By saying this, we mean that, via mistakes, species
may obtain benefits when randomising their behavioural patterns. This may enhance
their chance to survive invasions by mutants and some strategies could be adopted faster
than others.
In other words, we shall say that a strategy i obtains a potential learning advantage
if Si, the ith row of S, differs from ei, where ei is the ith member of a unitary basis,
and the species of type i are able to randomise their reaction to environmental changes
according to Si. We have chosen the word “advantage” to describe this difference from
other strategies as species of ith type are capable of executing strategies differing from
those of their own type. In some games, this means that they are able to execute strategies
required by the environmental conditions. By saying this we mean that species randomly
execute strategies that are required for their survival in the environment. That is, we do
not assume that they carry out this execution consciously. However, some game settings,
especially with humans, may require violation of this assumption. This ability may be
crucial when we consider changing environments where the ability to adapt becomes
particularly important.
Hence, a degree of incompetence may constitute either an evolutionary disadvantage or
an advantage. However, this strongly depends on the interplay among learning dynamics,
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learning advantages, and fitness advantages. Let us demonstrate this by considering
the particular form of the starting level of incompetence in the case where no learning
advantages are assumed for any strategy.
Definition 4.4.1 A uniform incompetent game is a game with the uniform matrix as a
starting level of incompetence, that is, sij =
1
n
,∀i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Next, we shall recall an equivalence result on the positive affine transformation of the
fitness matrix.
Lemma 4.4.1 [15] If Rˆ = kR+Cc, where k > 0 and Cc is some column-constant matrix,
then Γ and Γˆ have identical ESS, fixed points and their stability properties.
We can then simplify our incompetent game in the following manner.
Lemma 4.4.2 If the starting level of incompetence, S, is a uniform matrix, that is,
sij =
1
n
,∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, then the incompetent game Γλ is equivalent to the simplified
uniform incompetent game with the fitness matrix Rˆ(λ) = R + 1−λ
λn
RJ , where J is a
matrix of ones and R is the fitness matrix of the original game.
Proof.
Due to the fact that S is a uniform matrix we can rewrite the matrix of incompetence
(4.1) as:
Q(λ) =
1− λ
n
J + λI = QT (λ).
Then, the incompetent fitness matrix from (2.4) can be rewritten as
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R(λ) =
(
1− λ
n
)2
JRJ +
λ(1− λ)
n
(RJ + JR) + λ2R = λ2R + Cr + Cc,
where JR is a column-constant matrix with the constant element of the jth column being
r∗j =
∑
i rij. Similarly, RJ is a row-constant matrix with the constant element of the
ith row being ri∗ =
∑
j rij. Finally, JRJ is a constant matrix with all elements being∑
j
∑
i rij. In the above, we have set Cc :=
(
1−λ
n
)2
JRJ + λ(1−λ)
n
JR, a column-constant
matrix and Cr :=
λ(1−λ)
n
RJ a row-constant matrix. Then the fitness matrix can be written
as
R(λ) = λ2
(
R +
1
λ2
Cr +
1
λ2
Cc
)
. (4.11)
Applying Lemma 4.4.1 to (4.11) we see that it is sufficient to consider only the equilibria
and fixed points of
Rˆ(λ) = R +
1− λ
λn
RJ. (4.12)

The equivalent fitness matrix (4.12) has a very specific form which may simplify our
further analysis. Let us first recall the following result from [31].
Lemma 4.4.3 Consider a matrix R¯ = [rij + ri∗]
n,n
i,j=1, where ri∗ =
∑n
j=1 rij.
(i) For every (i, j), R¯ij = Rij + hij where hij is a linear combination of ri and Rij are
cofactors of R.
(ii)
∑n
j=1Rij =
∑n
j=1 R¯ij, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(iii) det(R¯) = det(R) + det (c˜, c2 − c1, . . . , cn − c1) , where cj are columns of R and c˜ is a
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vector of row sums of R.
Then the following result can be formulated.
Lemma 4.4.4 If Rˆ(λ) = R + 1−λ
λn
RJ , then det(Rˆ(λ)) = 1
λ
det(R).
Proof.
(i) Let us first consider the matrix Rˆ = R + RJ , hence, rˆij = rij + ri∗. According to
Lemma 4.4.3 (iii), the determinant of such a matrix can be written in the following form:
det(Rˆ) = det(R) + det(c˜, c2 − c1, . . . , cn − c1), (4.13)
since c˜ has entries ri∗ it is, in fact, the sum of the columns of R. Hence, the second term
of the determinant of Rˆ is a sum of n determinants:
det(c˜, c2 − c1, . . . , cn − c1) =
n∑
j=1
det(cj, c2 − c1, . . . , cn − c1).
Consider one of the determinants, in the above summation, for some j:
det(cj, c2 − c1, ..., cj − c1, ..., cn − c1) = det(cj, c2 − c1, ...,−c1, ..., cn − c1)
= − det(−c1, c2 − c1, ..., cj, ..., cn − c1) = det(c1, c2, ..., cj, ..., cn) = det(R).
Hence, from (4.13) we obtain det(Rˆ) = (n+ 1) det(R).
(ii) Now, let us consider the matrix Rˆ(λ) = R + λ(1−λ)
n
RJ . By an analogue to (4.13) the
determinant of Rˆ(λ) can be written as
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det(Rˆ(λ)) = det(R) +
1− λ
λn
det(c˜, c2 − c1, . . . , cn − c1) =
det(R) +
1− λ
λn
det(RJ) = det(R) +
1− λ
λn
× n det(R),
and we obtain the required result.

We know from Chapter 3 that there are very special balanced bifurcations of the fixed
points occurring for some values of λ (see Definition 3.2.6 and Lemma 3.2.2). However,
Lemma 4.4.4 shows that if det(R) 6= 0 then det(Rˆ(λ)) 6= 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1]. This implies
that for the case of the uniform incompetence we do not obtain any balanced bifurcation
points except, perhaps, at λ = 0. However, we may extend our conclusions and formulate
the following result.
Lemma 4.4.5 Let x˜ be an interior ESS of R. If the starting level of incompetence, S, is
a uniform matrix, that is, sij =
1
n
,∀i, j = 1, . . . , n and R is a row-sum-constant matrix,
then x˜ is an interior ESS for the incompetent game Rˆ(λ), for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof.
Since x˜ is an interior ESS, by Proposition 12 in [15] it is the unique solution of the equation
Rx˜ = (x˜Rx˜)1,
where 1 is a vector of ones. Therefore, R−1 exists and is equal to 1
det(R)
[Rij]
T , and we
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have
x˜k =
det(R)∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1Rij
×
∑n
i=1Rik
det(R)
=
∑n
i=1Rik∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1Rij
. (4.14)
From Lemma 4.4.2 we can consider the simplified uniform fitness matrix Rˆ(λ) = R +
1−λ
λn
JR. From Lemma 4.4.3 we know that
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Rij =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Rˆ(λ)ij.
Suppose now that x˜ is not an interior ESS for the game with Rˆ(λ). Then,
Rˆ(λ)x˜ 6= (x˜Rˆ(λ)x˜)1,
and hence, for some k
x˜k 6= x˜k(λ) =
∑n
i=1 Rˆ(λ)ik∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1 Rˆ(λ)ij
. (4.15)
Define γk(c˜) = det(c˜, c2− c1, ..., ck−1− c1,1, ck+1− c1, ..., cn− c1) for each j = 2, 3, . . . , n as
in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [31]. For j = 1 we set γ1(c˜) = det(1, c˜, c3−c2, ..., cn−c2). To
clarify the notation, let rˆ(λ)j (respectively, rj) denote the jth column of Rˆ(λ) (respectively,
R). Then,
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n∑
i=1
Rˆ(λ)ik = det(rˆ(λ)1, rˆ(λ)2, . . . , rˆ(λ)k−1,1, rˆ(λ)k+1, . . . , rˆ(λ)n) =
det(r1, . . . , rk−1,1, rk+1, . . . , rn)− γk(c˜) =
n∑
i=1
Rik − γk(c˜).
Hence, we can rewrite the right-hand side of (4.15) as
∑n
i=1 Rˆ(λ)ik∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1 Rˆ(λ)ij
=
∑n
i=1Rik − γk(c˜)∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1Rij
=
∑n
i=1Rik∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1Rij
− γk(c˜)∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1Rij
.
Note that if the matrix R is row-sum-constant, that is, c˜ = ν1 for some real ν, then
γk(c˜) = 0,∀k. Hence, in view of (4.14), x˜k = x˜k(λ), which is a contradiction to (4.15).
Let us now check that x˜ is also an ESS for Γλ. We require that yRˆ(λ)x˜ < x˜Rˆ(λ)x˜,∀y.
Note that
yRˆ(λ)x˜ = yRx˜ +
1− λ
λn
yRJ x˜,
and
x˜Rˆ(λ)x˜ = x˜Rx˜ +
1− λ
λn
x˜RJ x˜.
As x˜ is an interior ESS for R, we have yRx˜ < x˜Rx˜, ∀y. Furthermore, Rx˜ = (x˜Rx˜)1 and
RJ x˜ = R1 = ν1, where ν is the sum of any row of R. Hence
yRJ x˜ = yR1 = ν = x˜RJ x˜.
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Combining the above we obtain
yRx˜ +
1− λ
λn
yRJ x˜ < x˜Rx˜ +
1− λ
λn
x˜RJ x˜.
In the same manner, we can obtain the second condition on the ESS, that is, the condition
x˜Rˆ(λ)y > yRˆ(λ)y,∀y. First, note that
x˜Rˆ(λ)y = x˜Ry +
1− λ
λn
x˜RJy,
and
yRˆ(λ)y = yRy +
1− λ
λn
yRJy.
Then, we know that x˜Ry > yRy,∀y. In addition,
x˜RJy = x˜R1 = ν = yRJy,
and hence
x˜Ry +
1− λ
λn
x˜RJy > yRy +
1− λ
λn
yRJy.

The above result postulates that if initial incompetence is uniform, then the effect of mis-
takes is neglected in a row-sum constant game, which induces no overall fitness advantage
to any strategy. In other words, if in a row-sum constant game everyone is making the
same mistakes with the same probabilities, then the population dynamics are invariant
77
under these mistakes. We can extend this result to the general form of the fitness matrix
as follows.
Theorem 4.4.6 Let x˜ be an interior ESS of Γ1. If the starting level of incompetence, S,
is a uniform matrix, that is, sij =
1
n
,∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, then
x˜(µ) =
1
1− µ
(
x˜− µ
n
1
)
, (4.16)
where µ = 1 − λ, is an interior ESS for the incompetent game Rˆ(λ) and µ sufficiently
close to 0.
Proof.
By Lemma 4.4.2, for the uniform game it is sufficient to consider the simplified version
with Rˆ(λ) = R + 1−λ
λn
RJ . For µ = 1 − λ sufficiently close to 0, according to Theorem
2.2.3, we obtain a game which possesses an ESS. Then, this ESS can be found as
x˜(λ) = φ(λ)Rˆ(λ)−11,
where φ(λ) is as in (4.2). Hence, we need to analyse the inverse of the incompetent fitness
matrix. It can be done as follows:
R˜(λ)−1 = Rˆ(1− µ)−1 =
[
R
(
I − µ
(µ− 1)nJ
)]−1
.
Let µ
(µ−1)nJ = W , then apply Neumann series [66] to obtain the inverse of (I −W ) as
follows:
Rˆ(µ)−1 =
(
I +W +W 2 +W 3 + ...
)
R−1.
Then, the ESS for the incompetent game can be defined as
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x˜(µ) = φ(1− µ)
(
I +
µ
(µ− 1)nJ +
(
µ
(µ− 1)nJ
)2
+
(
µ
(µ− 1)nJ
)3
+ ...
)
R−11.
The above can be simplified because x˜ = φ(1)R−11, φ(1) 6= 0 and hence R−11 = x˜
φ(1)
. In
addition, Jk = nk−1J for each positive integer k and the series in the above expression
for x˜(µ) is geometric. Thus,
x˜(µ) =
φ(1− µ)
φ(1)
(
I +
µ
(µ− 1)nJ +
(
µ
(µ− 1)n
)2
nJ +
(
µ
(µ− 1)n
)3
n2J + ...
)
x˜
=
φ(1− µ)
φ(1)
(
I +
µ
(µ− 1)nJ
[
1 +
µ
1− µ +
(
µ
1− µ
)2
+
(
µ
1− µ
)3
+ ...
])
x˜
=
φ(1− µ)
φ(1)
(
I +
µ
(µ− 1)n ×
1
1− µ
µ−1
J
)
x˜ =
φ(1− µ)
φ(1)
(
I − µ
n
J
)
x˜.
Note that φ(1) = det(R)∑
i
∑
j Rij
, φ(1− µ) = det(Rˆ(1−µ))∑
i
∑
j Rij
and so
x˜(µ) =
det(Rˆ(1− µ))
det(R)
(
I − µ
n
J
)
x˜.
Hence by Lemma 4.4.4,
x˜(µ) =
1
1−µdet(R)
det(R)
(
I − µ
n
J
)
x˜,
and we obtain
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x˜(µ) =
1
1− µ
(
x˜− µ
n
1
)
.

Note that the point x˜(µ) = 1
1−µ
(
x˜− µ
n
1
)
remains a fixed point of the replicator dynamics
as long as it lies in the interior of the simplex, that is, as long as x˜k >
µ
n
, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Hence, this point will remain in the interior for all µ ∈ [0, 1] only for the case when
x˜k =
1
n
, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let us demonstrate these results on the example of a variant of the well-known Rock-
Scissors-Paper type game in which three strategies are competing: Rock beats Scissors,
Scissors beat Paper, Paper beats Rock. A classic form of this game leads to an unstable
periodic orbit due to the symmetry of the fitness matrix:
R =
Rock Scissors Paper

Rock 0 1 −1
Scissors −1 0 1
Paper 1 −1 0
.
However, we shall focus on the case when a unique interior attracting strategy exists.
Namely, we consider the variant with the matrix R given as follows:
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R =
Rock Scissors Paper

Rock 0 2 −1
Scissors −1 0 3
Paper 2 −2 0
.
This matrix game has an interior equilibrium point x˜ = (3
7
, 2
7
, 2
7
).
We assume that the starting level of incompetence is uniform, that is, S = 1
3
J . We see
that the interior equilibrium of the original (fully competent) game (see Figure 4.7, panel
(e)) is pushed to the population adopting only the Scissors strategy (see Figure 4.7, panel
(a)) in the case with a uniform starting level of incompetence, which is determined by
the payoff matrix structure. Then, as the incompetence parameter, λ, grows, that is,
competence is increasing, we see this equilibrium moves back towards the interior of the
simplex (see Figure 4.7, panels (b)–(d)). Hence, according to Theorem 4.4.6, we obtain a
new incompetent equilibrium given by
x˜(µ)1 =
9− 7µ
21− 21µ,
x˜(µ)2 =
6− 7µ
21− 21µ,
x˜(µ)3 =
6− 7µ
21− 21µ,
where µ = 1− λ, and indices 1,2,3 refer to Rock, Scissors, Paper, respectively.
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Theorem 4.4.6 implies that we adjust the ESS of the original game depending on the
level of incompetence. Furthermore, we may say that no learning advantages make the
population resistant to environmental changes. On the other hand, different adaptability
of strategies may be beneficial for species as they can randomise their reactions and re-
adapt to new conditions. For instance, some strategies may become preferable under
specific conditions. Furthermore, incompetence may be used to estimate perturbations in
environmental conditions that violate the evolutionary stability of population behavioural
choice.
Figure 4.7: Game flow for the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with (a) λ = 0.1, (b) λ = 0.2,
(c) λ = 0.226, (d) λ = 0.3, (e) λ = 1. Here, the only fixed point denoted by a red circle
is pushed from the vertex x2 to the interior of the simplex as λ→ 1.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we explored the influence of environmental fluctuations on the social
behaviour of species. Depending on the form of fluctuations and their frequency, a pop-
ulation may react in a different manner. However, in Section 4.4, we observed that if
changes provide advantages to some strategies, then asymmetry in reactions may arise.
In addition, in Section 4.3 we examined how the individual adaptation process of species
influences the population dynamics. Furthermore, we determined the critical time before
which a population is in an evolutionarily weak phase and can be invaded, as its com-
petence level has not yet reached the maximal critical value. This becomes even more
important when invasions happen in between seasons in the case with periodic fluctuations
when species are adapting to new conditions.
However, this weak-phase effect can be neglected when environmental changes imply no
asymmetry in strategic learning, that is, in the case with uniform starting incompetence
(see Theorem 3.4.6). However, it is natural to assume that in most cases we would expect
that specific environmental conditions require specifically different strategies. This in turn
makes even an evolutionary stable population vulnerable when facing invasions during
adaptation. We can even say that, in some cases, learning advantages make a population
resilient to environmental changes.
We explored the population dynamics under incompetence when a population reaches an
evolutionary stable state and we estimated a time interval required for the adaptation
process. However, depending on the environmental shifts and the populations under
consideration, this time interval can be long. Thus, the properties of the system during
the weak phase could be important. In future research, it will be interesting to explore
the behaviour of population dynamics under incompetence and the resilience to invasions
in the transient phase. However, in the following chapter we focus on the application
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of evolutionary games under incompetence. Specifically, we shall consider interactions
between marine microbes as an evolutionary game, with the aim of defining the optimal
foraging strategy for different environmental conditions.
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Chapter 5
Microbial games under incompetence
5.1 Optimal foraging strategies for marine bacteria
Bacteria are among the most abundant organisms on this planet. They affect the bio-
sphere by shaping microscale environmental processes, such as purifying water, controlling
the nitrogen cycle and detoxifying sewage and petroleum wastes [30, 80]. Hence, it is ex-
tremely important for microbiologists and ecologists to understand their behaviour and
reactions to environmental stimuli.
Despite their tiny size, these creatures are also driven by selection forces and their interac-
tions with their competitors and cooperators are quite complicated. Resources available
in natural environments are limited and hence cells have to face battles within bacte-
rial communities [83]. Prokaryotes communicate with surrounding organisms and make
decisions on the basis of the information they obtain. See Figure 5.1 for a schematic
illustration of the process. Even though their life processes involve many different as-
pects, they can not manage to have any interactions without obtaining enough energy
and required nutrition. Hence, foraging is a crucial process that requires efficiency from
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Figure 5.1: Marine bacterial scheme of decision making depending on noisy environmental
measurements, adapted from [51].
the foragers and, depending on their surroundings, this might be quite challenging.
Mathematical models were developed to explain foraging processes in animals and bacte-
ria. Usually these models are built to explain a specific search process. For example, in
application to bacteria, it could be the reaction of cell surface receptors, mechanical or
chemical stimuli, flagellar motor response, et cetera [51]. However, this approach does not
allow us to see the whole picture of how foraging strategies evolve as they are shaped by
the environmental conditions. Furthermore, there is a gap in our understanding of com-
mon features of search strategies and how these depend on the environmental constraints.
Hein et al. [51] claimed that evolutionary game theory may provide an insight to fill this
gap. We propose to use evolutionary game theory to build a universal game-theoretic
model that helps to understand the underlying evolution of foraging in marine bacteria.
Namely, we construct a matrix game that captures interactions between different strategic
types of microbes. The aim is to identify the most efficient strategy in the given environ-
mental conditions. The matrix captures the relative fitness advantage of each strategy
in comparison to all other strategies. In addition, it describes interactions between two
individual cells and reflects their payoffs, which are usually considered as changes in fit-
ness in the evolutionary context. We utilise the classical replicator equations [119] when
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Figure 5.2: A scheme of equipment used by E.coli for chemotaxis, adapted from [120].
modelling population dynamics. These dynamics reflect changes in the frequencies of each
strategy based on interactions among individuals.
Depending on the species under consideration, the time-scale of interactions in the pop-
ulation may differ from the reproduction time-scale. This is especially the case for big
mammals. However, microbes have a relatively short life time-span and their interactive
time scale could coincide with the time-scale of reproduction. Even though the interac-
tive time-scale is relatively short and individuals are forced to react rapidly, evolution and
adaptation usually require a longer period of time. When running experiments, biologists
measure changes in the fitness of the population each day, due to the fast reproduction
of microbes when they have enough resources [26]. Hence, there is no loss of generality
when assuming that the reproductive time-scale coincides with the interactive time-scale.
In the typical scenario, marine bacteria may exploit three foraging strategies. Firstly,
they can utilise oceanic flow to explore their environment without needing to expend en-
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ergy on swimming. We shall call such a strategy “nonmotile” bacteria. Secondly, they
may perform chemotactic swimming, that is, perform biased random motion towards
chemoattractants or away from repellents. Thirdly, they may explore their surroundings
by swimming in random directions without a specific goal, unlike the chemotactic strat-
egy. We shall say that such bacteria are randomly motile or, simply, “motile”. Though
chemotaxis seems an efficient strategy, the long-term advantage of chemotaxis may de-
pend on the environmental conditions cells live in. The fraction of motile microbes varies
in natural environments and may be as low as 10% [111]. However, the speed of swimming
may also affect the outcome of the competition. It was shown in [113] that fast cells swim
randomly and in some conditions may outcompete slow chemotactic cells.
Chemotaxis requires some equipment such as flagella, flagellar motors, and chemical re-
ceptors. Hence, to be able to perform a chemotactic strategy, a cell needs to obtain the
entire set of required tools. See Figure 5.2 for a schematic illustration of a chemotactic
cell. Nevertheless, such equipment can be produced by a bacterium if its genome contains
the corresponding genes. Surprisingly, if a cell’s genome does not contain the required
genes, bacteria may still obtain them from their neighbours. This process is called a hor-
izontal gene transfer [93], which allows bacteria to receive genetic materials from other
cells and incorporate those in their own genome.
Hence, we consider a population of marine bacteria that, due to the horizontal gene
transfer, may switch between behavioural types. We construct a three-dimensional ma-
trix game, where each bacterium can choose whether they are being randomly motile,
nonmotile, or chemotactic. We normalise the game by assuming that bacteria share some
resource of amount 1, for example, a food patch available for consumption. Consequently,
all parameters are assumed to vary in a range between 0 and 1. Then the interaction
fitness matrix is constructed as follows:
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Motile Nonmotile Chemotactic

Motile 1
2
− c p− c p− c
Nonmotile 1 1
2
0
Chemotactic 1− c+m 1− c+m 1
2
− c
.
We assume that interactions between species of the same type do not affect their repro-
ductive rate as, from the evolutionary perspective, these species receive their “common”
payoff of the entire population. That is, cells of the same type share the available resource
equally due to the fact that they both have the same chance, on average, to receive a given
amount of resources.
Next, we shall focus on the swimming strategies. Due to their small size, bacteria experi-
ence Brownian diffusion which rotates them up to 1,400 degrees in one second [91]. This
makes direct swimming towards their aim almost impossible. As a consequence, bacteria
often perform random runs and tumbles, which reduce the cost of swimming towards a
chemoattractant. Motility requires some energy loss, which is captured by c, which is the
price of motility. Further, random motility implies some uncertainty in randomly motile
bacteria eventually detecting a nutritional patch. Hence, we set a parameter p to be the
probability of a motile bacterium successfully finding resources.
On the other hand, the ability to detect and follow chemical gradients provides an ad-
ditional advantage to those who are adopting a chemotactic strategy. The parameter m
reflects an additional reward for being able to define and follow patches leading to in-
creased nutrients uptake [21]. Hence, we obtain a game where chemotactic bacteria are
rewarded for being able to search for the resources and follow them, which is in agreement
with the existing research (e.g., see [23, 115, 116]).
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Figure 5.3: Model predictions for different configurations of parameters. Here, we see
how different configurations of the parameters p,m and c determine the stability of the
strategies. The cost of swimming c has a critical value of 0.5 that determines the stability
of the nonmotile strategy: if the cost of swimming is too high, the more efficient nonmotile
strategy becomes attractive. Also, there is a threshold of m = c − 1
2
which leaves the
nonmotile strategy as the only reasonable choice for foraging.
The evolutionary game above can be analysed for equilibrium behaviour by analysing
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of its replicator equations. The latter display interesting
dependence on the parameters p, m, and c which we discuss below (for technical details
see Appendix C).
Different parameter configurations reflect different environmental conditions, for example,
a higher cost of swimming represents environments with tough hydrodynamic conditions
where cells have an increased energy loss. Hence, our parameters determine the behaviour
of the evolutionary dynamics under specific conditions. We define four qualitatively dif-
ferent parameter configurations leading to distinct selection outcomes and, hence, reflect
different types of the environment (see Figure 5.3).
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For environments where the cost of swimming is sufficiently high, that is c > 0.5, and
the reward for chemotaxis is not high enough, specifically m < c − 0.5, we observe the
dominance of nonmotile cells (Figure 5.4 panel (a)). This is supported by the fact that
in some hydrodynamic conditions rheotaxis, the ability to align in shear, interferes with
chemotaxis. Hence, additional fitness from swimming is sharply reduced due to increased
costs [85]. The threshold m < c − 0.5 ensures a critical trade-off for the efficiency of
chemotaxis defined by the environment.
However, when the cost of swimming is low, that is c < 0.5, and the abundance of food
is not high enough, resulting in p < 0.5, we observe the dominance of chemotactic cells
(Figure 5.4 panel (b)). This is predicted by the fact that growth rates of bacteria that
are close to patches increase by 50% [115]. This is also supported by previous studies,
which show that chemotaxis becomes advantageous in competition between non-mixed
populations even if the growth kinetics of the population is lower than the one of the
competitors [120].
Also, mathematical models predict that competition for a nutrient patch reveals a trade-
off between energy cost of swimming and a benefit of additional uptake [115]. Hence,
highly turbulent conditions lead to the case where the ability to search for nutrients is
becoming advantageous only in some cases and we observe the coexistence of nonmotile
and chemotactic cells (Figure 5.4 panel (c)). This case is observed whenever c > 0.5, m >
c− 0.5, and
p <
4mc+ 2c− 1
4m
.
We do observe motility whenever cells are competing in a nutrient-rich environment where
guaranteed high rewards for motility outweigh any costs [92].
Finally, under conditions similar to the sea bottom where swimming is becoming essential
for surviving we may observe coexistence of motile and chemotactic cells (Figure 5.4 panel
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Figure 5.4: Model predictions for different environments where the red circle corresponds
to a stable equilibrium of the game flow: (a) scarcity of resources: m = 0.2, p = 0.5,
c = 0.75, (b) patchiness of resources: m = 0.7, p = 0.25, c = 0.1, (c) turbulent conditions:
m = 0.5, p = 0.25, c = 0.75, (d) abundant conditions: m = 0.25, p = 0.75, c = 0.25.
(d)) for p > 0.5 and
c >
4mp+ 1
4m+ 4p
.
We did not find parameter values leading to the dominance of randomly motile cells due to
inefficiency of the strategy in this scenario. Also, we are unlikely to observe a coexistence
of randomly motile and nonmotile cells due to the fact that if swimming becomes as
effective as preserving the energy, it is better to use energy effectively and swim only
towards attractants [115].
Hence, based on the predictions of the model we can divide a water column in the regions
where we expect to observe particular foraging behaviour of microbes (see Figure 5.5). For
example, the muddy bottom of the ocean is becoming a region where abundant nutrients
lead to mostly actively swimming and chemotactic bacteria. However, deep waters with
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high salinity and low nutrients’ abundance force bacteria to preserve their energy and
most of the time stay nonmotile. In contrast, the turbulent region means that bacteria
will diversify their skills and prefer to stay nonmotile while being chemotactic only when it
is required. All our predictions are in the agreement with existing experimental literature
[13, 23, 115, 116]. This implies that an increase in the turbulent layer will lead to marine
bacteria exploiting chemotaxis more often than being nonmotile. We know that most of
the harmful bacteria are chemotactic and often form biofilms [23]. Hence, such an increase
in the turbulent layer may shift the population structure of marine bacteria towards a
higher abundance of harmful species. This may have an impact on key environmental
processes and the overall health of the aquatic ecosystem.
The ocean is a highly unstable environment. Turbulence and oceanic flows lead to mix-
ing of waters and environmental conditions change. Hence, behavioural patterns that
bacteria perform in a particular environment could change with time due to environmen-
tal changes. This forces marine microbes to re-adapt to their environmental conditions.
An example of a tool utilised by marine microbes for re-adaptation to the environment
is horizontal gene transfer, which may lead to behavioural stochasticity [93]. Another
example of behavioural randomisation is Clamydomonas that actively switch between
synchronised and asynchronised swimming to avoid predators [116]. Turbulence may also
impact the swimming direction of the microbe. We include behavioural randomisation
due to a changing environment in our model to observe how this instability may change
the outcome of the competition process for marine bacteria.
5.2 Learning to forage
Behavioural randomisation is a common strategy adopted by animals: from mammals
acting randomly in their hunting strategy execution to microbes such as Clamydomonas,
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Figure 5.5: Model predictions for different regions of the water column based on the
environmental conditions, adapted from [24].
which perform asynchronized rotation of their flagella. Additionally, marine microbes per-
form different degrees of chemotaxis across different water types [121]. That is, turbulence
also corrects the trajectory of the run. Furthermore, complex environmental conditions
may require conflicting reactions from organisms: in irregular environmental conditions,
when fluctuations are much faster than response time, it might be more efficient to behave
stochastically [19]. Hence, microbes are forced to randomise their swimming patterns and
the resulting diffusive swimming provides a greater evolutionary advantage. Addition-
ally, most environments are heterogeneous and so cell-to-cell interactions will occur under
conditions that are sometimes very different from the average [44].
Typically, evolutionary game theory assumes that species of one behavioural type are
always acting according to their own strategy. However, we know that on average only
10% of bacteria are motile in the ocean even though many more could easily become
motile [111]. Moreover, according to Adler’s experiments [2] with a chemoattractant in
a tube, not all of the individuals respond to environmental signals and react accordingly
to the stimuli. Can this incompetence in responses to environmental signals affect the
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outcome of the evolution? For example, if environmental conditions exhibit rapid changes,
cells would diversify their behaviour as time for the reaction is limited [35].
We utilise the concept of incompetence to capture behavioural stochasticity in bacteria
and construct the incompetence matrix Q(λ) as in (2.2) and (2.5). This matrix, in turn,
perturbs the fitness matrix R as in (2.4). We assume that the environment is shifted in
such a way that the starting level of incompetence for marine bacteria takes the form
S =
Motile Nonmotile Chemotactic

Motile 1
3
1
3
1
3
Nonmotile 0 1 0
Chemotactic 1
4
1
2
1
4
. (5.1)
Firstly, we assume that nonmotile cells do not have the required equipment, such as flag-
ella and flagellar motors, needed to exploit any of the foraging strategies that involve
swimming. Hence, their actions are not affected by incompetence and in any environmen-
tal conditions they behave as nonmotile cells, that is, sN = (0, 1, 0), the middle row of
S. Secondly, we assume when motile cells are immersed into new conditions, they tend
to randomise their behaviour and utilise a completely mixed strategy (see (5.1)), that is,
sM = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), the first row of S. Thirdly, the chemotactic cells in the new environment
would, most of the time, behave as nonmotile cells and execute a randomly motile or
chemotactic strategy with equal probabilities, hence sC = (
1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
), the third row of S.
This is due to the fact cells may require some time to “read” their new environment and
might have several signals to consider and require time to process environmental stimuli.
We assume that species may improve their competence by adapting to the environment
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and so reduce their probabilities of making mistakes. Lenski et al. [75] showed that
E. coli start to increase their relative fitness according to a power law when, after some
time, they reach a plateau once they are immersed in the new environment. However,
experimental conditions usually ensure that species immersed into the new environment
have all the required resources for successful reproduction. In the ocean, once species
migrate to the new environment or the environment is shifted, they firstly need to search
for resources to live and reproduce. Consequently, we expect the functional form of the
adaptation function λ(t) to have a sigmoid shape, that is,
λ(t) =
1
1 + e−a(αt−b)
. (5.2)
Hence, species start to improve their fitness slowly due to the low availability of nutrients,
which is followed by a rapid increase in their fitness, and after that they reach the plateau.
The time scale of adaptation might not coincide with the time-scale of reproduction.
For example, in experiments with E. coli [75] the relative growth of fitness of bacteria
slowed down significantly after approximately 10, 000 generations. After several decades
of running the experiment, it was recently shown that E. coli have not yet reached their
adaptive peak, even after 60, 000 generations [73]. Hence, the adaptation rate of bacteria
is much slower than the reproduction rate. However, there is no evidence that marine
microbes may exhibit the same behaviour and the same rates of adaptation as E. coli.
Marine environment may require their adaptation rate to be faster than that for the
laboratory experiments due to the tough environmental conditions and competition for
resources. Hence, we assume that the adaptation rate of marine microbes is much faster
than that of E. coli.
Consequently, the learning time is scaled to the reproduction time with some positive
constant α, whereas parameters a and b in λ(t) from (5.2) determine how fast and steep
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Figure 5.6: Adaptation in different environments: (a) learning adaptation function λ(t),
(b) population dynamics for patchiness of resources, (c) population dynamics for scarcity
of resources, (d) population dynamics for turbulent conditions, (e) population dynamics
for abundant conditions.
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species are adapting to their environment. The adaptation process then causes bifurca-
tions in the population dynamics and, hence, may change the outcome of the selection
process. In these settings, the convergence to the expected evolutionary stable outcome
might be postponed depending on the learning process, which then may lead to successful
invasions due to the weak evolutionarily phase of the population (see Section 4.4). How-
ever, if bifurcations cause the dominance of the strategy that was unfavourable in the fully
competent case, and species adapt sufficiently slowly, this may lead to this strategy having
an opportunity to outcompete other strategies and become evolutionary stable. Hence, in
order to reach evolutionary stable state again once the environment has changed, species
require time tc for adaptation defined from (3.7) as
tc =
1
α
(
b− 1
a
ln
(
1− λc
λc
))
. (5.3)
In our case, the critical time for the population is tc ≈ 1, 300 generations. While analysing
the parameters, we observe that the most crucial effect on the critical time comes from
α. Such an influence on critical times may imply that species in highly unstable environ-
ments have to adapt very quickly to leave their weak evolutionarily phase and become
stable. Hence, if 1
α
is large, adaptation may take a long period of time. Large α pro-
vides a benefit resulting in faster adaptation to the environment and faster achievement
of the evolutionary stability. We interpret α as a measure of species’ adaptive fitness.
In other words, how good the species is in re-adapting to changing conditions. It was
experimentally shown that bioenergetic tradeoffs are important when we are determining
adaptations to micro-scale nutrients [115], hence, α may measure such tradeoffs.
Therefore, we assume that the adaptation process implies that probabilities of making
mistakes are declining in a deterministic manner (as in (5.2)). However, this assumption
may be misleading for marine bacteria, as turbulence and oceanic flows cause constant
migration of species from one area to another. Moreover, environmental conditions are
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Figure 5.7: Adaptation in different environments: (a) learning adaptation function λ(t),
(b) population dynamics for patchiness of resources, (c) population dynamics for scarcity
of resources, (d) population dynamics for turbulent conditions, (e) population dynamics
for abundant conditions.
prone to periodic or irregular fluctuations in pH, temperature, toxins, nutrients avail-
ability, et cetera [83]. Hence, individuals are forced to re-adapt to new environmental
conditions over and over again, and the adaptation function may take a functional form
of a periodic function, such as, for example,
λ(t) =
1
2
sin(αt) +
1
2
. (5.4)
As in the sigmoid learning, we still obtain the measure α of the adaptive fitness for the pop-
ulation. According to the results from Chapter 4, in the case with a periodic adaptation
function we observe periodic fluctuations in the population dynamics reflecting environ-
mental fluctuations (see Figure 5.7). This supports previous studies on the environmental
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periodicity and reactions of populations [11]. Hence, we expect a populations’ behaviour
to fluctuate with the same frequency with which environmental conditions change.
Additionally, turbulence affects life of marine bacteria [115]. Mathematically, this can be
modelled via a stochastic adaptation process. Hence, we assume that λi is a random vari-
able and construct a stochastic learning process where each point λi is a random variable
that is determined by the species’ migration process. This assumption provides a more
realistic interpretation of the species’ behaviour when we take into account migration and
environmental stochasticity. However, games with an ESS are well known for being robust
[15], which is demonstrated clearly in Figure 5.8. We shall compare population dynamics
for two types of the learning processes: deterministic sigmoid learning and a stochastic
migration process. Hence, any learning process, either deterministic or stochastic, will
lead to the ESS in terms of a species’ choice (Figure 5.8 panels (a) and (d)). Observations
of the real behaviour depend on the incompetence matrix as in (3.18). Hence, population
behavioural observations for different learning processes will be different depending on
the learning dynamics. The stochastic learning brings us to a situation where the ma-
jority of bacteria in a population are able to perform chemotaxis (Figure 5.8 (d)) as in
the deterministic case. Due to incompetence chemotactic ability fluctuates around 50%
of the population and depends on the migration process as well (Figure 5.8 (e)).
Hence, due to incompetence, extinct strategies may still reappear in the behaviour of
individuals as a manifestation of mistakes that cause a revival of the extinct types. This
randomisation may become beneficial as a changing environment may require flexibility
from individuals in their adaptation. Even if the adaptive peak has been reached (i.e. λ =
1), behavioural randomisation may become an essential tool in preparedness to unforeseen
changes. This is supported by the existing research in stochastic phenotype switching,
when bacteria perform behavioural stochasticity even in the stable environments [58].
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5.3 Randomisation as a survival mechanism
The gradient-free environment around a bacterium is measured to be around one pico-
liter [118]. This is usually enough for a microbe to recognise environmental stimuli by
recognising signal molecules that reach their receptors and react accordingly. Often het-
erogeneous environmental conditions cause these picospheres to undergo rapid diffusion
processes, when the reaction has to occur over the same time scale. But typically, evolu-
tionary adaptation requires more time and hence this reaction may be prone to some time
delay. During these delays when cells are not yet adapted, invasions from other microbes
might occur [6, 86, 112].
In most cases microbial invasions research is focused on the host-parasite type of inter-
actions when pathogens arrive from the external environment. However, invasions often
happen when we consider a bacterial population dominating in some habitat. Here, in-
vasions would imply exactly the same problems as for any other invaded population:
competition for limited resources and survival through defence mechanisms of invaders.
However, hypotheses on invasions are hard to test in laboratory conditions as natural
communities might react differently and may develop different defence mechanisms in
comparison to their natural habitat [82]. This leads to the hypothesis that species’ ex-
perience in the environment may provide them some benefits when responding to newly
arrived competitors.
Resident bacterial populations frequently experience invasions from alien microbes. They
could happen due to natural or anthropogenic factors. Invaders can also start with a
relatively large population size. However, most bacterial invasions are unsuccessful. This
could be due to the fact that resident populations are stable and one could talk about
evolutionary stability. This is supported by experimental studies in [82] where bacterial
invasions of E.coli in natural soil bacterial population were unsuccessful. Nevertheless,
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Figure 5.8: Different forms of behavioural randomization and its effect on the population
dynamics: (a)–(c) deterministic learning process, (d)–(f) stochastic adaptation process.
these invasions have changed the structure of the resident species’ population and, hence,
influenced their further development and evolution.
Randomisation of behavioural patterns may play a role in surviving through the invasion:
high incompetence of invaders may lead to their extinction. This randomisation may help
to deal better with the first invasion as it shifts the community from the resources that
invaders prefer. As a consequence, the subsequent invasion has increased chances to be
successful.
As was noted before, bacteria are known to perform stochastic phenotype switching [58].
If environmental conditions require a specific behavioural strategy, then individuals who
switch to an inefficient strategy will most likely die. However, if conditions change in a
way that the “old” strategy may no longer be preferable, the population of species that
are unable to perform any other strategy will most likely become extinct. Hence, losing
some fraction of mutants is not as bad as losing the entire population from the selection
perspective. This behavioural randomisation provides a chance to be prepared for un-
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foreseen changes and, as a consequence, survive them. This becomes especially important
when we are considering invasions. Invaders come with a specific set of strategies available
to individuals. Also, the terrestrial species have their own set of strategies. Thus, those
that randomise their behavioural patterns and react in an unpredictable way may have
higher chances of success.
Incompetence of species considered in the context of a constantly changing environment
may provide a competitive advantage to those who are able to execute extinct strate-
gies when they are again becoming effective and required by the environment. This
redundancy of lost strategies helps extinct strategies reappear when they are needed and
provides species a chance to re-adapt to their environment.
Chemotaxis is known to be most commonly used for initial invasion, after which cells
often form biofilms [124]. Additionally, chemotaxis is key for quorum sensing and com-
munications within communities [90]. In the ocean, patches do not live for a long time
due to the constant diffusion process and so biofilm formation may not always be the
best strategy for the population. Randomisation in behaviour may lead to the population
surviving. Migration to a new patch can be considered an example of such randomisation.
For example, in [127], authors considered a bacterial population that has detected a patch
as a result of their foraging. It was shown that members of the group exploited two dif-
ferent strategies: colonisation of the patch (or biofilm formation), the population PS, and
detection of a new patch, the population PL. While population PS attaches to the patch
and forms biofilm losing its ability to swim actively, population PL remains chemotactic
and keeps seeking available resources. This ability to preserve both strategies provides
greater chances for survival, even though we would expect bacteria to only consume the
patch by forming biofilms, namely those belonging to population PS.
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5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we considered a problem from microbiology on determining an optimal
foraging strategy for marine bacteria depending on the environmental conditions. We de-
veloped a universal game-theoretic model that predicts the behaviour of marine microbes
depending on the environment. This leads to the division of the water column into several
niches and population structures based on the model predictions.
Indeed, in environments where resources are abundant and distributed as patches, it is
natural to expect microbes to perform chemotaxis and motility, as this type of foraging
provides better chances for detecting nutrients. However, once turbulence and water
diffusion are added, the cost of swimming leads to the vanishing reward of randomly motile
cells due to energy expenses. Moreover, in such conditions microbes do not have to swim
to explore their surroundings and so nonmotile bacteria appear in the ESS. Furthermore,
in harsh conditions, when resources are limited and cells may starve, swimming itself may
lead to the death of a too-active bacterium. Hence, in deep waters we expect microbes to
be mostly nonmotile and energy efficient.
Natural environments are highly unstable and dynamic. Hence, individuals are required
to re-adapt to the changing conditions. We considered a behavioural randomisation as a
tool for survival under instability of the environment. We aimed to answer the question of
how randomisation of behavioural patterns may affect the evolution. Indeed, we support
the hypothesis that randomisation may help species to survive and provide a competitive
advantage.
Behavioural stochasticity may also lead to resistance against invasions. This is especially
the case for marine bacteria that have to survive through a constant migration process
and hence have to maintain their ability to face new competitors. Hence, behavioural
stochasticity may become key for the survival of populations.
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Chapter 6
Summary and future research
6.1 Incompetence in evolutionary games
Natural selection and adaptation of species to changing environments are popular areas for
research in mathematical biology. These problems have been considered from biological,
ecological, mathematical, economic, and many other perspectives. Despite this, there
are still gaps in our understanding of how nature drives species to survival or extinction
in complex environments. One possible way to analyse evolution of populations is to
consider it as a game. The resulting behaviour then demonstrates Darwin’s principle of
survival of the fittest.
This doctoral project combined areas of game theory, dynamical systems, and microbiol-
ogy. The novelty of this research lies in the introduction of the concept of incompetence
into dynamic evolutionary games. This approach allows for the fact that many species,
like humans, may not be able to execute their favoured strategies perfectly and hence
require learning. “Learning” can be interpreted as an adaptation process of organisms to
new environmental conditions, such as those arising due to migration of species or changes
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in climate. At a theoretical level, we showed that incompetence leads to the existence of
an evolutionarily weak phase when even evolutionary stable populations are vulnerable to
invasions once certain environmental conditions arise.
Additionally, this research assisted in gaining a deeper understanding of the behaviour of
marine bacteria. We have developed a new mathematical framework that can be applied
to explain a particular problem from microbiology. Marine bacteria exploit different be-
haviours depending on their environmental conditions, especially when it comes to forag-
ing strategies. This has been studied more extensively on the micro-scale levels. However,
the macro-scale understanding is still missing. We need to explain what drives species
to react with specific responses to environmental changes, and why new niche behaviours
occur [51]. We constructed a game-theoretic model to explain microbial evolution and
their optimal foraging strategies for given environmental conditions. Furthermore, we
analysed their reactions to environmental changes. The model predicts that behavioural
randomisation is an essential part of strategic adaptation, meaning that flexibility in the
executions of strategies may increase a population’s probability of survival.
6.2 Hierarchical learning
In a spin-off project not included in this thesis, we considered with coauthors a case where
each strategic choice has its own learning parameter, and organisms perform hierarchical
learning. Hierarchical learning assumes that species may prioritise skills they need to
acquire and, effectively, focus on learning only one skill at a given time. We are aiming to
answer the question of how to learn to execute all available strategies in an optimal way.
We considered an optimisation problem where the fitness of the population depends on
these learning decisions and showed that the order in which strategies are learned matters.
The fitness of the population may be increased or decreased depending on the order in
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which they reduce their strategies’ incompetence by learning. Thus, learning order could
be an essential part of the organism’s evolution and ultimate survival.
Species often cooperate when they are forced to survive in harsh conditions. As a result,
our understanding of the reactions of species to the environmental stimuli is incomplete
without an understanding of how the possibility to cooperate affects behavioural patterns.
6.3 Extensions to cooperative evolutionary games
What is better for survival: cooperation, or competition, or a suitable balance of both?
Many models predict that cooperation is not an optimal strategy and that populations
should adopt selfishness. However, cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. What is driving it
and how does it depend on the species under consideration? Comprehensive explanation
of the evolution of cooperation is a longstanding biological challenge.
If we consider a population immersed in a dynamic environment that is prone to constant
changes, the ability to merely reproduce may no longer take precedence over, say, the
ability to adapt and use resources efficiently. Additionally, inter- and intra-species coop-
eration may also benefit long-term survival. As future research, we propose to investigate
the problem of evolution in a dynamic environment where the availability of resources
is affected both by environmental changes and species’ behaviour. The ultimate goal of
such an extension would be to analyse optimal ways of adaptation through learning.
When constructing evolutionary games, we are often interested in the existence of an ESS.
However, an ESS, viewed in its most simplistic theoretical framework, may not exist, for
example in complex real-world systems [109, 110]. We want to focus on problems when
an ESS may theoretically exist but is not reachable due to the changing environment.
Additionally, we want to investigate whether an ESS may still appear on the global time
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scale, even if the environment is constantly shifting. This problem can be considered as
a stochastic evolutionary game where environmental changes are described via a Markov
Process. Then, the adaptation of species to the new environment is captured as learning
and can be described via the idea of incompetence.
6.3.1 Stochastic evolutionary games and adaptation to complex
environments
We are interested in examining the influence of learning on the evolution of coopera-
tion. In particular, we observe that some environmental conditions promote intra- and
inter-species cooperative mechanisms that lead to mutualism or group living. These mech-
anisms evolved under conditions when an environment is determined not only by natural
uncertainty but also by the actions of animals. This can be considered as a stochastic
game where transitions depend on the behaviour of both Nature and players. A recent
idea is to model changing environmental conditions via stochastic games in evolutionary
game theory. Although Markov decision evolutionary games (MDEG) were constructed
in 2010 [4], utilising them to analyse cooperation in changing environments is a 2018
development [52]. This connection fills a gap in evolutionary game theory, where the
classic approach was to consider a static environment. A missing theoretical component
still exists: species immersed in dynamical environments may adapt, building resilience
to changes while shaping their local environment. Hence, further extension of stochastic
evolutionary games to adaptation through learning will provide us with a deeper under-
standing of how evolution acts on a bigger scale.
In order to tackle this problem, we propose to consider a formulation via stochastic games
with incompetence. Next, we need to extend this analysis to an evolutionary dynamics
perspective. The outcome of this research will be to determine whether environmental
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conditions or species intra-individual adaptation is driving selection. To achieve this,
we aim firstly to describe complex dynamic environments via infinite horizon stochastic
games, which could be considered as Competitive Markov Decision Processes [32]. Adap-
tation of species will then be modelled by assuming that species are making mistakes
in their execution of selected strategies. Then we would need to investigate complex
adaptation dynamics and compare them to the approach that incorporates incompetence.
6.4 Applications of the research
A natural extension to this work is to investigate how stochastic evolutionary games un-
der incompetence behave when we consider networks and complex population dynamics.
Evolution of species and food webs is a fundamental area of study in ecology, and is
especially important in the context of climate change and other anthropogenic impacts
on the natural environment. The application of game theory to microbial interactions is
now becoming popular due to the fact that evolution can be observed on short time scales
when running experiments with bacteria [7, 43, 73]. Furthermore, some cells, for example
cancer cells, exhibit non-cooperative selfish behaviour given that other cells in organ-
isms are usually cooperative. Hence, studying cooperation and adaptation in stochastic
environments is an important area of research.
There is a need for further large-scale studies of microbial interactions to clarify the impor-
tance of cooperative and competitive traits in nature [99]. We intend to formulate testable
hypotheses on the evolution of cooperation in bacteria for laboratory conditions and in
nature. Specifically, we are interested in considering the factors that cause cooperative
adaptations such as horizontal gene transfer, co-aggregation, and other internal and ex-
ternal factors. It would be natural to consider network settings in which the spatiogenetic
structure of different genotypes is taken into account.
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Appendix A
A special form of the Jacobian
matrix
In this appendix, we derive a general form of the Jacobian matrix for the fixed point
x˜ when only one behavioural type goes extinct. Without loss of generality we assume
x˜ = (x1, ..., xn−1, 0). Consider the form of the Jacobian for the replicator dynamics: in
general, the ijth element has the following form (see (3.7)):
[∇g]ij =

∑n
k=1 rikxk − 2
∑n
k=1 xkxi (rik + rki)−
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l xlxkrkl, ∀i = j
xirij − x2i (rij + rji)− xi
∑
k 6=i,j xk (rkj + rjk) , i 6= j.
(A.1)
Firstly, consider the diagonal elements and rewrite them as follows
[∇g]ii = fi − 2xi
(
fi +
n∑
k=1
xkrki
)
−
∑
l 6=i
xl
(∑
k 6=i,l
xkrkl
)
. (A.2)
We recall from the proof of Proposition 3.2.1 that at the fixed point x˜ = (x1, ..., xn−1, 0)
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we had fi = 0 for i 6= n and hence (A.2) becomes
[∇g]ii =
−2xi
∑n
k=1 xkrki −
∑
l 6=i xl
(∑
k 6=i,l xkrkl
)
, ∀i 6= n
fn −
∑
l 6=n xl
(∑
k 6=n,l xkrkl
)
, i = n.
(A.3)
Next, analyse the vector ∇gx˜ from (3.7) and rewrite it in a matrix form
∇gx˜ =
[
xi
(
2
∑
j 6=i
xj r˜ij −
(
3
∑
j 6=i
xixj(r˜ij + r˜ji) + 3
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkr˜kl
))]n
i=1
. (A.4)
Next, observe that
∑
l 6=i
xl
(∑
k 6=i,l
xkrkl
)
=
1
2
{
x˜T
(
R +RT
)
x˜− x˜T [Ei (R +RT )+ (R +RT )Ei]ni=1 x˜} ,
(A.5)
where Ei is a matrix with [E]ii = 1 and 0 as all other elements. Note that x˜
T
(
R +RT
)
x˜ =
2φ and
x˜TEi
(
R +RT
)
x˜ = xifi + xi
(∑
k
rkixk
)
= x˜T
(
R +RT
)
Eix˜.
Substituting the latter to (A.5) we obtain
∑
l 6=i
xl
(∑
k 6=i,l
xkrkl
)
=
1
2
{
2φ− 2xifi − 2xi
(∑
k
rkixk
)}
= φ− xifi − xi
(∑
k
rkixk
)
.
(A.6)
Then, we can rewrite (A.4) as follows
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∇gx˜ =
[
xi
(
2
∑
j 6=i
xj r˜ij −
(
3
∑
j 6=i
xixj(r˜ij + r˜ji) + 3
∑
l 6=i
∑
k 6=i,l
xlxkr˜kl
))]n
i=1
= X˜
(
2Rx˜− 3X˜ (R +RT ) x˜− 3
2
x˜T
(
R +RT
)
x˜× 1− 3
2
x˜T
[
Ei
(
R +RT
)
+
(
R +RT
)
Ei
]n
i=1
x˜
)
= X˜
(
2Rx˜− 3X˜ (R +RT ) x˜− 3x˜TRx˜× 1 + 3Rx˜ + 3X˜RT x˜) . (A.7)
We can rewrite the diagonal elements of the Jacobian as
[∇gx˜]ii =
 xi (
∑
k rkixk) , ∀i 6= n
fn + xn (
∑
k rknxk) , i = n.
(A.8)
Next, consider the off-diagonal elements. We begin by simplifying the last term in the
second branch of (A.1). Since rii = 0 in the canonical form of the fitness matrix R, we
have
xi
(∑
k 6=i,j
xkrkj +
∑
k 6=i,j
xkrjk
)
= xi
(∑
k 6=i
xkrkj +
∑
k 6=i
xkrjk
)
= xi
[(
n∑
k=1
xkrkj − xirij
)
+
(
n∑
k=1
xkrjk − xirji
)]
= xi
(
n∑
k=1
xkrkj
)
+ xifj − x2i rij − x2i rji. (A.9)
From (A.1), for i 6= j, (A.9) implies that
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[∇gx˜]ij = xirij − x2i (rij + rji)− xi
∑
k 6=i,j
xk (rkj + rjk)
= xirij − x2i (rij + rji)−
[
xi
(
n∑
k=1
xkrkj
)
+ xifj − x2i rij − x2i rji
]
= xirij − xifj − xi
(
n∑
k=1
xkrkj
)
,
and hence
[∇gx˜]ij =
xirij − xifj − xi (
∑n
k=1 xkrkj) , ∀i 6= n
0, i = n
. (A.10)
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Appendix B
Singular perturbations of a fitness
matrix
In our proofs we often use the inverse of the fitness matrix R. Specifically, in the proof of
Theorem 4.4.6 we use the Neumann expansion [66]. However, we could take a different
approach from the singular perturbations perspective. In this case we need to rewrite the
fitness matrix in the form:
R(λ) = λ2R + λ(1− λ) (SR +RST )+ (1− λ)2SRST
= SRST + λ
(
SR +RST − 2SRST )+ λ2 (SRST +R− SR−RST ) . (B.1)
For simplicity we can rewrite this equation as
R(λ) = SRST + λE1 + λ
2E2, (B.2)
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where E1 = SR +RS
T − 2SRST and E2 = SRST +R− SR−RST .
Hence, in the case when (SRST )−1 exists we should not have any issues. However, if
the inverse does not exist, we obtain a singular perturbation case in the limit as λ → 0.
Similarly, we could think of these perturbations for λ → 1 for the case when R−1 does
not exist. Then, we need to set µ = 1− λ and consider
R(µ) = R + µ
(
SR +RST − 2R)+ µ2 (R + SRST − SR−RST ) = R + µG1 + µ2G2.
(B.3)
In the case with singular perturbations, we can think of a reward matrix R as a matrix
with quadratic perturbations from [5] of the form
A(z) = A+ zD1 + z
2D2. (B.4)
Its inverse can be found as (see Section 2.2.7 in [5]), where in our context, z = λ or z = µ,
corresponding to the cases
R−1(λ) =
1
λp
(Y0 + λY1 + . . .) , (B.5)
or
R−1(µ) =
1
µq
(W0 + µW1 + . . .) . (B.6)
The right-hand sides of (B.5)–(B.6) are matrix Laurent series in λ and µ, respectively.
The coefficients of powers of λ (respectively, µ) can be found by using the fact that
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R(λ)R(λ)−1 = I (R(µ)R(µ)−1 = I, respectively). Hence, for the case with perturbations
in λ we need to solve a system of equations of the form
SRSTY0 = 0
SRSTY1 + E1Y0 = 0
SRSTY2 + E1Y1 + E2Y0 = 0
...
SRSTYp + E1Yp−1 + E2Yp−2 = I
SRSTYp+1 + E1Yp + E2Yp−1 = 0
...
A perturbation analysis along the lines of Section 2.2.7 in [5] is possible. We did not apply
this technique as in the case with interior fixed points perturbations under incompetence
were not singular.
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Appendix C
Analysis of the foraging game
In Section 5.1 we described the results of a particular example, which we derived with
the help of calculations provided in more detail here. In particular, the reward matrix we
analyse in this appendix is constructed as follows:
Motile Nonmotile Chemotactic

Motile 1
2
− c p− c p− c
Nonmotile 1 1
2
0
Chemotactic 1− c+m 1− c+m 1
2
− c
.
We shall analyse a canonical form of this matrix given by:
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Motile Nonmotile Chemotactic

Motile 0 p− 1
2
− c p− 1
2
Nonmotile 1
2
+ c 0 c− 1
2
Chemotactic 1
2
+m 1
2
− c+m 0
.
Then, the resulting replicator equations g(x) = x˙ are given by:
g1 = x˙M = −xM [(−p+ 0.5 + c+ pxM +mxC)xN + ((m+ p)xM − p+ 0.5)xC ] ,
g2 = x˙N = xN [((m− p)xC + 0.5 + c− pxN)xM + (c− 0.5−mxN)xC ] , (C.1)
g3 = x˙C = −xC [(pxN + (m+ p)xC − 0.5−m)xM + (c− 0.5−m+mxC)xN ] .
As before, we analysed this game dynamics with MAPLE 2016.1 to determine the critical
points and analyse their stability via the Jacobian matrix and its eigenvalues. Solving
gi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 symbolically, we find that seven different equilibria are possible: each
vertex of the simplex S3, points on each edge and one interior equilibrium. The equilibria
corresponding to points on each edge are:
1. Motile – Nonmotile:
xM =
p− c− 0.5
p
,
xN =
c+ 0.5
p
,
xc = 0.
2. Motile – Chemotactic:
xM =
p− 0.5
m+ p
,
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xN = 0,
xC =
m+ 0.5
m+ p
.
3. Nonmotile – Chemotactic:
xM = 0,
xN =
c− 0.5
m
,
xC =
m− c+ 0.5
m
.
From MAPLE, the single interior equilibrium is given by:
xM =
4m(p− c)− 2c+ 1
4mp+ 1
,
xN =
4m(c− p) + 4pc− 1
4mp+ 1
,
xC =
4p(m− c) + 2c+ 1
4mp+ 1
.
However, the interior equilibrium is not feasible in our settings because of the assumption
that all parameters are varying in the interval [0, 1].
The entries of the Jacobian matrix of this game are given by:
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∇(g(x))11 = xN(p− c− 0.5− 2xMp− xCm) + xC(p− 0.5− 2xMm− 2xMp),
∇(g(x))12 = −xM((xM − 1)p+ c+ 0.5 + xCm),
∇(g(x))13 = −xM((m+ p)xM − p+ 0.5 + xNm),
∇(g(x))21 = xN(−(xN + xC)p+ c+ 0.5− xCm),
∇(g(x))22 = xM((−(m+ p)xC + c+ 0.5− 2xNp) + xC(c− 0.5− 2xNm),
∇(g(x))23 = xN(−(xM + xN)m+ c− 0.5− xMp),
∇(g(x))31 = −xC(xNp+ (m+ p)xC −m− 0.5),
∇(g(x))32 = −xC((xC − 1)m+ c− 0.5 + xMp),
∇(g(x))33 = xM(m+ 0.5− 2xCm− xNp− 2xCp) + xN(m− c+ 0.5− 2xCm).
We then compute eigenvalues of this matrix at each fixed point of the replicator dynamics
and determine the parameter configurations for which these eigenvalues are negative.
Please see Section 5.1 for the outcomes of this analysis.
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